We investigate the role of co-skewness in pricing stock returns in the Chinese and U.S. markets. In both markets, co-skewness is priced with a negative premium. The annualized factor-adjusted co-skewness effect is −7.98% in China and −3.53% in the U.S. The negative co-skewness effect coexists with other higher-moment-related pricing effects. Through two natural experiments in the Chinese and U.S. markets, we find that an improvement in the information environment greatly enhances the co-skewness pricing effect in both markets. Furthermore, we find that the governance structure and the efficiency level are the main determinants of the co-skewness premium in the Chinese market.
After an investigation of an audit engagement is announced, does media coverage of the investigation affect the involved auditor’s behaviors in his/her other (noninvestigated) engagements? This paper attempts to answer this question using data on Chinese listed firms during the 2002–2019 period. We find that an auditor is more likely to issue modified audit opinions in his/her non-investigated engagements if the investigation attracts a high level of media coverage, as media coverage arouses suspicions in stakeholders and causes the auditor to fear potential regulatory action, litigation, and reputational damage. This augmenting effect of media coverage exists only when the information environment of the non-investigated engagement is opaque, when the non-investigated engagement has a relatively high level of earnings management, when the involved auditor is the review auditor, when the involved auditor is not a busy auditor, and when the news comes from an opinion leader. The results are robust after controlling for general media attention, auditor-level attributes, and alternative measurements of key variables. Our results suggest that the media can play an effective role in broadening the sphere of influence of regulatory actions.