Massimo Morelli

Massimo Morelli

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Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

29Years (1998-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 October 2021 in Political Analysis
Verified
Journal Article
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MOMoritz Osnabrügge
Moritz Osnabrügge
EAElliott Ash
Elliott Ash
MMMassimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli
We introduce and assess the use of supervised learning in cross-domain topic classification. In this approach, an algorithm learns to classify topics in a labeled source corpus and then extrapolates topics in an unlabeled target corpus from another domain. The ability to use existing training data makes this method significantly more efficient than within-domain supervised learning. It also has three advantages over unsupervised topic models: the method can be more specifically targeted to a research question and the resulting topics are easier to validate and interpret. We demonstrate the method using the case of labeled party platforms (source corpus) and unlabeled parliamentary speeches (target corpus). In addition to the standard within-domain error metrics, we further validate the cross-domain performance by labeling a subset of target-corpus documents. We find that the classifier accurately assigns topics in the parliamentary speeches, although accuracy varies substantially by topic. We also propose tools diagnosing cross-domain classification. To illustrate the usefulness of the method, we present two case studies on how electoral rules and the gender of parliamentarians influence the choice of speech topics.

26 May 2020 in Political Analysis
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MVMatia Vannoni
Matia Vannoni
EAElliott Ash
Elliott Ash
MMMassimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli
Bureaucratic discretion and executive delegation are central topics in political economy and political science. The previous empirical literature has measured discretion and delegation by manually coding large bodies of legislation. Drawing from computational linguistics, we provide an automated procedure for measuring discretion and delegation in legal texts to facilitate large-scale empirical analysis. The method uses information in syntactic parse trees to identify legally relevant provisions, as well as agents and delegated actions. We undertake two applications. First, we produce a measure of bureaucratic discretion by looking at the level of legislative detail for US states and find that this measure increases after reforms giving agencies more independence. This effect is consistent with an agency cost model, where a more independent bureaucracy requires more specific instructions (less discretion) to avoid bureaucratic drift. Second, we construct measures of delegation to governors in state legislation. Consistent with previous estimates using non-text metrics, we find that executive delegation increases under unified government.

26 August 2020 in Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
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RCRoberto Censolo
Roberto Censolo
MMMassimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli
Epidemics create risks of social unrest. The great plagues of the past show that social tensions, accumulated over the epidemic and before, often erupted in serious uprisings in the years after the epidemic. Based on historical evidence, we predict that the protests inherited from the pre-COVID-19 period should be crowded out by epidemic-related unrest as long as the epidemic lasts, whereas in the aftermath of the epidemic we should expect the unresolved pre-epidemic grievances to resume even stronger, boosted also by the incremental social grievances related to the epidemic period. While the epidemic lasts, the status quo and incumbent governments tend to consolidate, but a sharp increase in social instability in the aftermath of the epidemic should be expected.

12 August 2010 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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JHJohannes Horner
Johannes Horner
MMMassimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli
FSFrancesco Squintani
Francesco Squintani
This paper brings mechanism design to the study of conflict resolution in international relations. We determine when and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict, in a simple game where conflict is due to asymmetric information. Unmediated communication helps reducing the chance of conflict as it allows conflicting parties to reveal their types and establish type-dependent transfers to avoid conflict. Mediation improves upon unmediated communication when the intensity of conflict is high, or when asymmetric information is large. The mediator improves upon unmediated communication by not precisely reporting information to conflicting parties, and precisely, by not revealing to a player with probability one that the opponent is weak. Surprisingly, in our set up, arbitrators who can enforce settlements are no more effective in reducing the probability of conflict than mediators who can only make non-binding recommendations.

1 March 2016 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMassimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli
IPIn-Uck Park
In-Uck Park

23 June 2015 in Social Choice and Welfare
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Journal Article
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FMFrançois Maniquet
François Maniquet
MMMassimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli