Developing quantum key distribution (QKD) has been recently directed toward distance extension and network expansion for real-world secure communications. Considering a recent report on a quantum communication network over 4,600 km, it seems that QKD networks using conventional protocols have been sufficiently studied. However, although the twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) proposed for long-distance QKD has been studied deeply enough to succeed the demonstrations over 428- and 511-km deployed fibers, TF-QKD networks have been verified only for a ring network. In this work, we propose a star topological 2 × N TF-QKD network scheme, where the coherence maintenance issue, being the primary obstacle to implementing TF-QKD, can be minimized by the automatic mode-matching feature of the Sagnac-based plug-and-play architecture. A lower number of active controllers is required for our scheme in comparison with one-way TF-QKD networks. Moreover, our scheme adopts a cost-effective configuration that requires only a single pair of single-photon detectors for the entire network system. We conducted a proof-of-concept experiment over a 50-km fiber successfully, achieving an average secret key rate of 1.31 × 10−4 bit per pulse (1.52 bit per second) with the finite-size effect.
We developed a countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with a background-noise-cancellation scheme in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Background-noise cancellation includes self-differencing and balanced avalanche photon diode (APD) schemes and is considered a promising solution for low-noise APDs, which are critical components in high-performance QKD systems. However, its vulnerability to blinding attacks has been recently reported. In this work, we propose a countermeasure that prevents this potential security loophole from being used in detector blinding attacks. An experimental QKD setup is implemented and various tests are conducted to verify the feasibility and performance of the proposed method. The obtained measurement results show that the proposed scheme successfully detects occurring blinding-attack-based hacking attempts.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems have proven their theoretically unconditional security by quantum mechanics, but the scalability and cost barriers limit the rapid growth of the QKD system industry. The integration of QKD systems on chips has enabled their widespread adoption in secure quantum communication technologies, but the optimized platforms and designs are still being studied. Herein, we fabricated monolithic quantum photonic circuits for the BB84 QKD protocol using thin-film lithium niobate (TFLN), which enables flexible design in organizing both active and passive elements on one chip based on its superior material properties. The proposed circuit design for both transmitter and receiver parts are identical, which facilitates stable operation and mass production. Using our device, we demonstrated QKD over a field-deployed quantum channel, and its performance is comparable to state-of-the-art. This result proved the potential of TFLN for quantum communication technology.
A Mach–Zehnder modulator (MZM) is necessary for implementing a decoy-state protocol in a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system. However, an MZM bias control method optimized for QKD systems has been missing to date. In this study, we propose an MZM bias control method using N (≥2) diagnostic pulses. The proposed method can be efficiently applied to a QKD system without any additional hardware such as light sources or detectors. Furthermore, it does not reduce the key rate significantly because it uses time slots allocated to existing decoy pulses. We conducted an experimental demonstration of the proposed method in a field-deployed 1 × 3 QKD network and a laboratory test. It is shown that our method can maintain the MZM extinction ratio stably over 20 dB (bit error rate ≤1%), even in an actual network environment for a significant period. Consequently, we achieved successful QKD performances.
The commercialization of quantum key distribution (QKD), which enables secure communication even in the era of quantum computers, has acquired significant interest. In particular, plug-and-play (PnP) QKD has garnered considerable attention owing to its advantage in system stabilization. However, a PnP QKD system has limitations on miniaturization owing to a bulky storage line (SL) of tens of kilometers. And, the secure key rate is relatively low because Bob transmits the signal pulses only at the dedicated time slots to circumvent backscattering noise. This study proposes a new method that can eliminate the SL by realizing an optical pulse train generator based on an optical cavity structure. Our method allows Alice to generate optical pulse trains herself by duplicating Bob’s seed pulse and excludes the need for Bob’s strong signal pulses that trigger backscattering noise as much as the conventional PnP QKD. Accordingly, our method can naturally overcome the miniaturization limitation and the slow secure key rate, as the storage line is no longer necessary. We conducted a proof-of-concept experiment using our method and achieved a key generation rate of 1.6×10−3 count/pulse and quantum bit error rate ≤ 5%.
In most quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, a decoy-state protocol is implemented for preventing potential quantum attacks and higher mean photon rates. An optical intensity modulator attenuating the signal intensity is used to implement it in a QKD system adopting a one-way architecture. However, in the case of the plug-and-play (or two-way) architecture, there are technical issues, including random polarization of the input signal pulse and long-term stability. In this study, we propose a method for generating decoy pulses through amplification using an optical amplifier. The proposed scheme operates regardless of the input signal polarization. In addition, a circulator was added to adjust the signal intensity when the signal enters the input and exits the QKD transmitter by monitoring the intensity of the output signal pulse. It also helps to defend against Trojan horse attacks. A test setup for the proof-of-principle experiment was implemented and tested, and it was shown that the system operated stably with a quantum bit error rate (QBER) value of less than 5% over 26 h using a quantum channel (QC) of 25 km.