24 April 2022 in Political Research Quarterly
The divide between college graduates and non-college graduates is an increasingly important political cleavage. In this paper, I document the rise of the diploma divide on the micro and macro levels. First, I use ANES and CES data to assess the relationships between educational attainment, partisanship, and vote choice. I find that post-2000, educational attainment is an increasingly strong predictor of partisanship and, in turn, vote choice. I demonstrate that differences in racial and culture war attitudes between college graduates and non-graduates drive the diploma divide. I then show that the increasing salience of education at the individual level has reshaped the macro-level political alignment. Between 2000 and 2020, the percentage of a county’s population with a BA is one of the strongest predictors of changes in vote share, with highly educated counties becoming more Democratic and less educated counties becoming more Republican. Finally, I demonstrate that county-level educational context conditions the effect of degree-holding on individual-level behavior. Having a college education is a stronger predictor of Democratic partisanship in counties where a larger proportion of the population holds a college degree. Overall, these results demonstrate the diploma divide is one of the dominant political cleavages in contemporary American politics.
1 March 2016 in Electoral Studies
1 March 2014 in State Politics & Policy Quarterly
State legislatures have been extremely active in passing legislation relating to all facets of immigration policy over the last several years. In this article, I develop a framework that explains how party ideology, party control of the legislature, and electoral conditions affect the likelihood that a state legislature will adopt policies that increase immigration enforcement. I test my arguments using state immigration policy adoption data that span from 2005 to 2011. I find that conservative Republican state parties are more likely to pass legislation enhancing immigration enforcement—on the condition that the Republican Party controls the state's legislative institutions. However, the willingness of Republican-controlled legislatures to pass immigration reform is often tempered by electoral concerns. Republican-controlled legislatures in states where Latinos make up a large proportion of the electorate are significantly less likely to adopt new legislation that targets undocumented migrants. I argue that Republican support for increasing sanctions on undocumented migrants is eroded by the potential for an electoral backlash from Latino voters. Democratic-controlled legislatures are unlikely to pass legislation under any conditions. Ultimately, the observed pattern of policy adoption is the product of the trade-off between the state parties' ideologically driven policy goals and the electoral consequences associated with actually implementing immigration policies.
22 December 2015 in British Journal of Political Science
Though there is widespread scholarly consensus that American political elites have become increasingly ideologically polarized, there remains debate about how the mass electorate has responded to the increase in polarization at the elite level. This article shows that as party elites have become more polarized, individuals have become better able to identify the party that best matches their own ideological positions, thereby contributing to polarization at the mass level. Using forty years of ANES and DW-NOMINATE data to test this argument, it was found that the relationship between a voter’s position in policy space and their political behavior is indeed conditional upon polarization at the elite level. This finding demonstrates how changes in elite polarization translate to behavioral changes on the mass level.
16 July 2018 in American Politics Research
The electoral fortunes of state parties are partly shaped by the positions adopted by national parties. This creates the potential dilemma: The position that is best for the national party might be too extreme for the electorate in some states. Some state parties attempt to address this problem by adopting more moderate positions than their national-level counterparts. We argue that the efficacy of state party moderation hinges on the degree of polarization at the national level. We develop theory and examine empirical evidence that higher relative polarization at the national level exacerbates the degree to which national party positions and loyalties determine outcomes in U.S. state elections. When relative national polarization is high, we find evidence that state legislative election outcomes are determined by states’ orientations toward the national parties rather than the positions taken by state legislative parties.
9 July 2018 in International Political Science Review
In this article, we argue that a deeper understanding of citizen satisfaction with democratic elections requires a global perspective. Regional research found that a gap in satisfaction with democracy emerges after an election, between those who supported winning parties and those that did not, and also, crucially, that this gap can be reduced under proportional electoral institutions. In this article we argue instead that these theories of the winner–loser gap actually apply to only a narrow set of countries. We use a comprehensive global dataset to show that the predictions of this theory about the effects of proportional institutions are accurate for Western Europe, but not outside it. Beyond a small cluster of established democracies in Western Europe, the electoral environment is characterized by more fundamental uncertainty. This uncertainty alters the incentives created by proportional institutions. We conclude that the winner–loser gap and ‘losers’ consent’ are concepts that vary systematically around the world. We discuss the implications of this for democratic stability.