Eric T. Juengst

Eric T. Juengst

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Eric T. Juengst

UNC Center for Bioethics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

38Years (1989-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 March 2008 in PLOS Biology
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Journal Article
Open access
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TCTimothy Caulfield
Timothy Caulfield
AMAmy L McGuire
Amy L McGuire
MCMildred Cho
Mildred Cho
JBJanet A Buchanan
Janet A Buchanan
MBMichael M Burgess
Michael M Burgess
MTMichael Timmons
Michael Timmons
Interest in whole-genome research has grown substantially over the past few months. This article explores the challenging ethics issues associated with this work.

4 June 2016 in BMC Medical Ethics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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JWJ. Patrick Woolley
J. Patrick Woolley
MMMichelle L. McGowan
Michelle L. McGowan
HTHarriet J. A. Teare
Harriet J. A. Teare
VCVictoria Coathup
Victoria Coathup
JFJennifer R. Fishman
Jennifer R. Fishman
EJEric T. Juengst
Eric T. Juengst
The language of “participant-driven research,” “crowdsourcing” and “citizen science” is increasingly being used to encourage the public to become involved in research ventures as both subjects and scientists. Originally, these labels were invoked by volunteer research efforts propelled by amateurs outside of traditional research institutions and aimed at appealing to those looking for more “democratic,” “patient-centric,” or “lay” alternatives to the professional science establishment. As mainstream translational biomedical research requires increasingly larger participant pools, however, corporate, academic and governmental research programs are embracing this populist rhetoric to encourage wider public participation. We examine the ethical and social implications of this recruitment strategy. We begin by surveying examples of “citizen science” outside of biomedicine, as paradigmatic of the aspirations this democratizing rhetoric was originally meant to embody. Next, we discuss the ways these aspirations become articulated in the biomedical context, with a view to drawing out the multiple and potentially conflicting meanings of “public engagement” when citizens are also the subjects of the science. We then illustrate two uses of public engagement rhetoric to gain public support for national biomedical research efforts: its post-hoc use in the “care.data” project of the National Health Service in England, and its proactive uses in the “Precision Medicine Initiative” of the United States White House. These examples will serve as the basis for a normative analysis, discussing the potential ethical and social ramifications of this rhetoric. We pay particular attention to the implications of government strategies that cultivate the idea that members of the public have a civic duty to participate in government-sponsored research initiatives. We argue that such initiatives should draw from policy frameworks that support normative analysis of the role of citizenry. And, we conclude it is imperative to make visible and clear the full spectrum of meanings of “citizen science,” the contexts in which it is used, and its demands with respect to participation, engagement, and governance.

16 May 2014 in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
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Journal Article
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SCSuparna Choudhury
Suparna Choudhury
JFJennifer R. Fishman
Jennifer R. Fishman
MMMichelle L. McGowan
Michelle L. McGowan
EJEric T. Juengst
Eric T. Juengst
The BRAIN Initiative aims to break new ground in the scale and speed of data collection in neuroscience, requiring tools to handle data in the magnitude of yottabytes (1024). The scale, investment and organization of it are being compared to the Human Genome Project (HGP), which has exemplified ‘big science’ for biology. In line with the trend towards Big Data in genomic research, the promise of the BRAIN Initiative, as well as the European Human Brain Project, rests on the possibility to amass vast quantities of data to model the complex interactions between the brain and behaviour and inform the diagnosis and prevention of neurological disorders and psychiatric disease. Advocates of this ‘data driven’ paradigm in neuroscience argue that harnessing the large quantities of data generated across laboratories worldwide has numerous methodological, ethical and economic advantages, but it requires the neuroscience community to adopt a culture of data sharing and open access to benefit from them. In this article, we examine the rationale for data sharing among advocates and briefly exemplify these in terms of new ‘open neuroscience’ projects. Then, drawing on the frequently invoked model of data sharing in genomics, we go on to demonstrate the complexities of data sharing, shedding light on the sociological and ethical challenges within the realms of institutions, researchers and participants, namely dilemmas around public/private interests in data, (lack of) motivation to share in the academic community, and potential loss of participant anonymity. Our paper serves to highlight some foreseeable tensions around data sharing relevant to the emergent ‘open neuroscience’ movement.

21 September 2016 in Hastings Center Report
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Journal Article
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EJEric Juengst
Eric Juengst
MMMichelle L. McGowan
Michelle L. McGowan
JFJennifer R. Fishman
Jennifer R. Fishman
RSRichard A. Settersten
Richard A. Settersten

12 March 1997 in JAMA
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Journal Article
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SPStephen G. Post
Stephen G. Post
PWPeter J. Whitehouse
Peter J. Whitehouse
RBRobert H. Binstock
Robert H. Binstock
TBThomas D. Bird
Thomas D. Bird
SESharen K. Eckert
Sharen K. Eckert
AZArthur B. Zinn
Arthur B. Zinn
Objective. —Primary caregivers should be aware of recent progress in the genetics of Alzheimer disease (AD) and of the clinical and ethical considerations raised regarding the introduction of genetic testing for purposes of disease prediction and susceptibility (risk) analysis in asymptomatic individuals and diagnosis in patients who present clinically with dementia. This statement addresses arguments for and against clinical genetic testing. Participants. —The 20 participants were selected by the investigators (S.G.P., T.H.M., A.B.Z., and P.J.W.) to achieve balance in the areas of genetics, counseling, ethics, and public policy, and to include leadership from related consensus projects. The consensus group met twice in closed meetings and carried on extensive correspondence over 2 years (1995-1997). The project was supported by the National Human Genome Research Institute of the National Institutes of Health. Evidence. —All 4 involved chromosomes were discussed in group meetings against a background of information from several focus group sessions with AD-affected families. The focus groups comprised volunteers identified by the Cleveland Area Chapter of the Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association and represented a variety of ethnic populations. Consensus Process. —The first draft was written in April 1996 by the principal investigator (S.G.P.) after the consensus group had met twice. The draft was mailed to all consensus group members 3 times over 6 months for extensive response and redrafting by the principal investigator until all members were satisfied. Conclusions. —Except for autosomal dominant early-onset families, genetic testing in asymptomatic individuals is unwarranted. Use ofAPOEgenetic testing as a diagnostic adjunct in patients already presenting with dementia may prove useful but it remains under investigation. The premature introduction of genetic testing and possible adverse consequences are to be avoided.

1 April 1997 in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
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Journal Article
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EJEric T. Juengst
Eric T. Juengst
In discussions of the ethics of human gene therapy, it has become standard to draw a distinction between the use of human gene transfer techniques to treat health problems and their use to enhance or improve normal human traits. Some dispute the normative force of this distinction by arguing that it is undercut by the legitimate medical use of human gene transfer techniques to prevent disease – such as genetic engineering to bolster immune function, improve the efficiency of DNA repair, or add cellular receptors to capture and process cholesterol. If disease prevention is a proper goal of medicine, these critics argue, and the use of gene transfer techniques to enhance human health maintenance capacities will help achieve that goal, then the “treatment/enhancement” distinction cannot define the limits of legitimate gene therapy. In this paper, I argue that a line can be drawn between prevention and enhancement for gene therapy (and thus between properly medical and nonmedical uses of gene therapy), but only if one is willing to accept two rather old-fashioned claims: 1) Some health problems are best understood as if they were entities in their own right, reifiable as processes or parts in a biological system, with at least as much ontological objectivity and theoretical significance as the functions that they inhibit. 2) Legitimate preventive genetic health care should be limited to efforts to defend people from attack by these more robust pathological entities, rather than changing their bodies to evade social injustices.