1 March 2021 in Molecular Systems Biology
Our understanding of complex living systems is limited by our capacity to perform experiments in high throughput. While robotic systems have automated many traditional hand‐pipetting protocols, software limitations have precluded more advanced maneuvers required to manipulate, maintain, and monitor hundreds of experiments in parallel. Here, we present Pyhamilton, an open‐source Python platform that can execute complex pipetting patterns required for custom high‐throughput experiments such as the simulation of metapopulation dynamics. With an integrated plate reader, we maintain nearly 500 remotely monitored bacterial cultures in log‐phase growth for days without user intervention by taking regular density measurements to adjust the robotic method in real‐time. Using these capabilities, we systematically optimize bioreactor protein production by monitoring the fluorescent protein expression and growth rates of a hundred different continuous culture conditions in triplicate to comprehensively sample the carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus fitness landscape. Our results demonstrate that flexible software can empower existing hardware to enable new types and scales of experiments, empowering areas from biomanufacturing to fundamental biology.
7 October 2024 in IACR Communications in Cryptology
Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) allow a client to evaluate a pseudorandom function (PRF) on her secret input based on a key that is held by a server. In the process, the client only learns the PRF output but not the key, while the server neither learns the input nor the output of the client. The arguably most popular OPRF is due to Naor, Pinkas and Reingold (Eurocrypt 2009). It is based on an Oblivious Exponentiation by the server, with passive security under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this work, we strengthen the security guarantees of the NPR OPRF by protecting it against active attacks of the server. We have implemented our solution and report on the performance. Our main result is a new batch OPRF protocol which is secure against maliciously corrupted servers, but is essentially as efficient as the semi-honest solution. More precisely, the computation (and communication) overhead is a multiplicative factor as the batch size increases. The obvious solution using zero-knowledge proofs would have a constant factor overhead at best, which can be too expensive for certain deployments. Our protocol relies on a novel version of the DDH problem, which we call the Oblivious Exponentiation Problem (OEP), and we give evidence for its hardness in the Generic Group model. We also present a variant of our maliciously secure protocol that does not rely on the OEP but nevertheless only has overhead over the known semi-honest protocol. Moreover, we show that our techniques can also be used to efficiently protect threshold blind BLS signing and threshold ElGamal decryption against malicious attackers.