Kunihiro Kuroda

Kunihiro Kuroda

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Kunihiro Kuroda

Ritsumeikan University, Kusatsu, Japan

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 March 2023 in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KKKunihiro Kuroda
Kunihiro Kuroda
YFYuta Fukuda
Yuta Fukuda
KYKota Yoshida
Kota Yoshida
TFTakeshi Fujino
Takeshi Fujino
Deep-learning side-channel attacks, applying deep neural networks to side-channel attacks, are known that can easily attack some existing side-channel attack countermeasures such as masking and random jitter. While there have been many studies on profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks, a new approach that involves applying deep learning to non-profiled attacks was proposed in 2018. In our study, we investigate the structure of multi-layer perceptrons and points of interest for non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks using the ANSSI database with a masking countermeasure. The results of investigations indicate that it is better to use a simple network model, apply regularization to prevent over-fitting, and select a wide range of power traces that contain side-channel information as the points of interest. We also implemented AES-128 software implementation protected with the Rotating Sboxes Masking countermeasure, which has never been attacked by non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks, on the Xmega128 microcontroller and carried out non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks against it. Non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks successfully recovered all partial keys while the conventional power analysis could not. The attack results also showed that the least significant bit is the adequate selection for successful non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attacks, but the best labeling method may vary depending on the implementation of the countermeasure algorithm. We conducted two experimental analyses to clarify that deep-learning side-channel attacks learn mask values used in the masking countermeasure. One is the gradient visualization used in previous studies, and the other is a new analysis method using partial removal of power traces.