Social interactions are often characterized by cooperation within groups and conflict or competition between groups. In certain circumstances, however, cooperation can arise between social groups. Here, we examine the circumstances under which inter-group cooperation is expected to emerge and present examples with particular focus on groups in two well-studied but dissimilar taxa: humans and ants. Drivers for the evolution of inter-group cooperation include overarching threats from predators, competitors or adverse conditions, and group-level resource asymmetries. Resources can differ between groups in both quantity and type. Where the difference is in type, inequalities can lead to specialization and division of labour between groups, a phenomenon characteristic of human societies, but rarely seen in other animals. The ability to identify members of one's own group is essential for social coherence; we consider the proximate roles of identity effects in shaping inter-group cooperation and allowing membership of multiple groups. Finally, we identify numerous valuable avenues for future research that will improve our understanding of the processes shaping inter-group cooperation.
14 March 2019 in Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews
Male blue monkeys ( Cercopithecus mitis stuhlmanni ) of Budongo Forest, Uganda, produce two acoustically distinct alarm calls: hacks to crowned eagles ( Stephanoaetus coronatus ) and pyows to leopards ( Panthera pardus ) and a range of other disturbances. In playback experiments, males responded to leopard growls exclusively with a series of pyows and to eagle shrieks predominantly with hacks. Responses to playbacks of these alarm call series matched the responses to the corresponding predators, suggesting that the calls conveyed something about the nature of the threat. When responding to a series of hacks, indicating an eagle, males responded predominately with hacks, but produced significantly more calls if their group members were close to the playback stimulus than far away, regardless of their own position. When responding to a series of pyows, indicating a range of disturbances, males responded with pyows, but call rates were independent of the distance of other group members. The results suggest that males took into account the degree of danger experienced by other group members.
Exploitation in cooperative interactions both within and between species is widespread. Although it is assumed to be costly to be exploited, mechanisms to control exploitation are surprisingly rare, making the persistence of cooperation a fundamental paradox in evolutionary biology and ecology. Focusing on between-species cooperation (mutualism), we hypothesize that the temporal sequence in which exploitation occurs relative to cooperation affects its net costs and argue that this can help explain when and where control mechanisms are observed in nature. Our principal prediction is that when exploitation occurs late relative to cooperation, there should be little selection to limit its effects (analogous to “tolerated theft” in human cooperative groups). Although we focus on cases in which mutualists and exploiters are different individuals (of the same or different species), our inferences can readily be extended to cases in which individuals exhibit mixed cooperative-exploitative strategies. We demonstrate that temporal structure should be considered alongside spatial structure as an important process affecting the evolution of cooperation. We also provide testable predictions to guide future empirical research on interspecific as well as intraspecific cooperation.