15 February 2025 in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
26 July 2024 in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
8 September 2022 in International Journal of Managerial Finance
Purpose: Literature sparsely documents the association between the deviant behavior of a firm and its financial policies. Trade credit is one of the most critical financial policies of a firm. In this study, the authors examine the association between strategic deviance and trade credit.Design/methodology/approach: The authors explore a strategy-based explanation for trade credit by examining whether strategic deviance affects trade credit using a sample of 33 countries from 1996 to 2020. The authors test the hypothesis using static OLS regression models. To address autocorrelation and endogeneity issues, the authors use dynamic OLS models, lag models, and instrumental variable approach.Findings: The authors find that an increase in strategic deviance reduces both demand and supply of trade credit, and the study’s results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in strategic deviance leads to a 1.34% decrease in the demand for trade credit. Also, a one standard deviation increase in strategic deviance leads to a 2.26% fall in the supply of trade credit.Practical implications: This study facilitates managers to formulate trade credit policies when choosing a deviant strategy.Originality/value: To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to explore the association between strategic deviance and trade credit policies.
5 July 2024 in Managerial Finance
Purpose: Prior literature on the cultural determinants of cash holdings focuses on time-invariant cultural variables measured at the geographical level. These measures of culture do not capture the firm-level variation in corporate culture. Using a validated time-variant measure of firm-level corporate culture, specifically teamwork, we examine the effect of teamwork on a firm's cash holdings.Design/methodology/approach: In this paper, we explore the effect of corporate teamwork culture on firms' cash holdings. Using sudden CEO turnover as an exogenous shock to a firm's teamwork culture, we find teamwork increases cash holdings. Also, we test and find two channels—financial constraint and agency—and two new labour-related channels—human capital quality and labour inefficiency—through which teamwork culture affects cash holdings. Our results are robust to endogeneity tests.Findings: We find that teamwork increases the cash holdings of firms. We find that a firm with a high teamwork culture has higher cash holdings: an increase of one standard deviation in teamwork leads to a 14.6% rise in the mean cash holdings.Originality/value: To our knowledge, our study is the first to introduce the firm-level teamwork cultural construct as a determinant of cash holdings.
13 November 2026 in International Journal of Managerial Finance
Purpose: This paper examines whether firm-level regulatory fragmentation is associated with corporate credit ratings. We also investigate three firm characteristics that moderate the association between regulatory fragmentation and credit ratings: compliance cost, managerial ability and resource capacity. Design/methodology/approach: We use a firm-year regulatory fragmentation measure derived from textual analysis of the Federal Register. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we apply propensity score matching and entropy balancing. As supporting evidence, we examine changes in credit ratings around the implementation of the Dodd–Frank Act. For the moderation analysis, we use interaction models. Findings: Regulatory fragmentation is positively associated with corporate credit ratings. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of regulatory fragmentation corresponds to a 0.278 higher credit rating, equivalent to 6.95% of the interquartile range of credit ratings. It also corresponds to a 6.19 percentage point higher probability of an investment-grade rating. This association varies with firm characteristics: it is less positive for firms with higher compliance costs and more positive for firms with higher managerial ability and higher resource capacity. Practical implications: The association between regulatory fragmentation and credit ratings varies with a firm's capacity to absorb multi-agency oversight. Therefore, firms operating in fragmented regulatory environments may improve their credit ratings by reducing financial constraints, managing compliance costs efficiently and appointing and retaining high-ability management teams. Our findings also suggest that policymakers seeking to reduce regulatory multiplicity may consider firm-level variation, specifically firms with higher compliance costs and financial constraints. Originality/value: This study provides the first evidence on the association between regulatory fragmentation and corporate credit ratings. Unlike existing studies using aggregate regulatory measures, we employ a firm-year measure capturing cross-sectional variation in regulatory multiplicity. We further document that this association varies with compliance costs, managerial ability and resource capacity, offering insight into how the structure of the regulatory environment shapes firms' credit ratings.