Chaewon Shin

Chaewon Shin

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Chaewon Shin

Information Convergence engineering, Pusan National University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 June 2026 in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SSSuhyeon Song
Suhyeon Song
JPJaeyeol Park
Jaeyeol Park
CSChaewon Shin
Chaewon Shin
DKDonghyun Kwon
Donghyun Kwon
As edge devices continue to improve in performance, their role is expanding in real-world environments such as smart factories and smart homes, where executing server-provided code on edge devices is essential for real-time processing and operational flexibility. However, edge code deployment introduces several security challenges, including the exposure of sensitive data and operations to runtime attacks, the absence of remote attestation mechanisms to validate code integrity and execution correctness, and insufficient access control for sensitive peripherals. Existing solutions address only a subset of these challenges and therefore fail to provide comprehensive security guarantees for edge devices. In this article, we present TzPy , a Python runtime designed for secure edge code deployment on ARM TrustZone. TzPy enables the execution of Python code entirely within the secure world. In addition, we design a remote attestation mechanism that verifies both the static integrity of deployed Python code and its runtime control flow through control-flow tracing. Furthermore, TzPy enforces a manifest-driven, fine-grained peripheral access control mechanism to prevent unauthorised or unintended access to sensitive devices. We evaluate TzPy on a Raspberry Pi 3B+ using a smart farm workload and a blinky application, and the results show an end-to-end overhead of 13.4%.

8 October 2026
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
SSSuhyeon Song
Suhyeon Song
CSChaewon Shin
Chaewon Shin
DKDonghyun Kwon
Donghyun Kwon

5 January 2026 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CSChaewon Shin
Chaewon Shin
GHGowon Han
Gowon Han
SSSuhyeon Song
Suhyeon Song
JPJinsun Park
Jinsun Park
YCYoon-Ho Choi
Yoon-Ho Choi
DKDonghyun Kwon
Donghyun Kwon
WebAssembly (Wasm) has recently gained attention in embedded systems due to its lightweight runtime support and broad compatibility with various languages and platforms. However, Wasm’s linear memory model lacks internal protection mechanisms, making it vulnerable to a wide range of memory safety violations. To address this, prior work has proposed techniques for protecting memory within the linear memory space. While effective to some extent, these approaches either suffer from limited detection coverage or are unsuitable for resource-constrained embedded systems. In this paper, we present WARD, a redzone-based memory protection technique tailored for Wasm in tiny embedded systems. At its core, WARD employs a randomized linear-to-physical address translation mechanism, which enables effective detection of memory violations without requiring specific hardware extensions. Our evaluation shows that WARD provides improved memory detection coverage over prior techniques, with reasonable performance of 24.2% on benchmark and 13.03% on real-world applications, and memory overhead suitable for embedded systems.