Huy Phan

Huy Phan

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Huy Phan

Rutgers University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 October 2022
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
CSCong Shi
Cong Shi
TZTianfang Zhang
Tianfang Zhang
ZLZhuohang Li
Zhuohang Li
HPHuy Phan
Huy Phan
TZTianming Zhao
Tianming Zhao
YCYingying Chen
Yingying Chen
Deep learning models have become key enablers of voice user interfaces. With the growing trend of adopting outsourced training of these models, backdoor attacks, stealthy yet effective training-phase attacks, have gained increasing attention. They inject hidden trigger patterns through training set poisoning and overwrite the model's predictions in the inference phase. Research in backdoor attacks has been focusing on image classification tasks, while there have been few studies in the audio domain. In this work, we explore the severity of audio-domain backdoor attacks and demonstrate their feasibility under practical scenarios of voice user interfaces, where an adversary injects (plays) an unnoticeable audio trigger into live speech to launch the attack. To realize such attacks, we consider jointly optimizing the audio trigger and the target model in the training phase, deriving a position-independent, unnoticeable, and robust audio trigger. We design new data poisoning techniques and penalty-based algorithms that inject the trigger into randomly generated temporal positions in the audio input during training, rendering the trigger resilient to any temporal position variations. We further design an environmental sound mimicking technique to make the trigger resemble unnoticeable situational sounds and simulate played over-the-air distortions to improve the trigger's robustness during the joint optimization process. Extensive experiments on two important applications (i.e., speech command recognition and speaker recognition) demonstrate that our attack can achieve an average success rate of over 99% under both digital and physical attack settings.

22 May 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZTZijie Tang
Zijie Tang
TZTianming Zhao
Tianming Zhao
TZTianfang Zhang
Tianfang Zhang
HPHuy Phan
Huy Phan
YWYan Wang
Yan Wang
YCYingying Chen
Yingying Chen
Deep learning (DL) has recently become a key technology supporting radio frequency (RF) signal classification applications. Given the heavy DL training requirement, adopting outsourced training is a practical option for RF application developers. However, the outsourcing process exposes a security vulnerability that enables a backdoor attack. While backdoor attacks have been explored in the vision domain, it is rarely explored in the RF domain. In this work, we present a stealthy backdoor attack that targets DL-based RF signal classification. To realize such an attack, we extensively explore the characteristics of the RF data in different applications, which include RF modulation classification and RF fingerprint-based device identification. Then, we design a training-based backdoor trigger generation approach with different optimization procedures for two backdoor attack scenarios (i.e., poison-label and clean-label). Extensive experiments on two RF signal classification datasets show that the attack success rate is over 99.2%, while its classification accuracy for the clean data remains high (i.e., less than a 0.6% drop compared to the clean model). The low NMSE (less than 0.091) indicates the stealthiness of the attack. Additionally, we demonstrate that our attack can bypass existing defense strategies, such as Neural Cleanse and STRIP.

26 June 2023 in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HPHuy Phan
Huy Phan
MYMiao Yin
Miao Yin
YSYang Sui
Yang Sui
BYBo Yuan
Bo Yuan
SZSaman Zonouz
Saman Zonouz
Model compression and model defense for deep neural networks (DNNs) have been extensively and individually studied. Considering the co-importance of model compactness and robustness in practical applications, several prior works have explored to improve the adversarial robustness of the sparse neural networks. However, the structured sparse models obtained by the existing works suffer severe performance degradation for both benign and robust accuracy, thereby causing a challenging dilemma between robustness and structuredness of compact DNNs. To address this problem, in this paper, we propose CSTAR, an efficient solution that simultaneously impose Compactness, high STructuredness and high Adversarial Robustness on the target DNN models. By formulating the structuredness and robustness requirement within the same framework, the compressed DNNs can simultaneously achieve high compression performance and strong adversarial robustness. Evaluations for various DNN models on different datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of CSTAR. Compared with the state-of-the-art robust structured pruning, CSTAR shows consistently better performance. For instance, when compressing ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10, CSTAR achieves up to 20.07% and 11.91% improvement for benign accuracy and robust accuracy, respectively. For compressing ResNet-18 with 16x compression ratio on Imagenet, CSTAR obtains 8.58% benign accuracy gain and 4.27% robust accuracy gain compared to the existing robust structured pruning.

3 April 2020 in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HPHuy Phan
Huy Phan
YXYi Xie
Yi Xie
SLSiyu Liao
Siyu Liao
JCJie Chen
Jie Chen
BYBo Yuan
Bo Yuan
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attack despite their tremendous success in many artificial intelligence fields. Adversarial attack is a method that causes the intended misclassfication by adding imperceptible perturbations to legitimate inputs. To date, researchers have developed numerous types of adversarial attack methods. However, from the perspective of practical deployment, these methods suffer from several drawbacks such as long attack generating time, high memory cost, insufficient robustness and low transferability. To address the drawbacks, we propose a Content-aware Adversarial Attack Generator (CAG) to achieve real-time, low-cost, enhanced-robustness and high-transferability adversarial attack. First, as a type of generative model-based attack, CAG shows significant speedup (at least 500 times) in generating adversarial examples compared to the state-of-the-art attacks such as PGD and C&W. Furthermore, CAG only needs a single generative model to perform targeted attack to any targeted class. Because CAG encodes the label information into a trainable embedding layer, it differs from prior generative model-based adversarial attacks that use n different copies of generative models for n different targeted classes. As a result, CAG significantly reduces the required memory cost for generating adversarial examples. Moreover, CAG can generate adversarial perturbations that focus on the critical areas of input by integrating the class activation maps information in the training process, and hence improve the robustness of CAG attack against the state-of-art adversarial defenses. In addition, CAG exhibits high transferability across different DNN classifier models in black-box attack scenario by introducing random dropout in the process of generating perturbations. Extensive experiments on different datasets and DNN models have verified the real-time, low-cost, enhanced-robustness, and high-transferability benefits of CAG.

29 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
TZTianfang Zhang
Tianfang Zhang
HPHuy Phan
Huy Phan
ZTZijie Tang
Zijie Tang
CSCong Shi
Cong Shi
YWYan Wang
Yan Wang
YCYingying Chen
Yingying Chen
Deep learning-enabled Voice User Interfaces (VUIs) have surpassed human-level performance in acoustic perception tasks. However, the significant cost associated with training these models compels users to rely on third-party data or outsource training services. Such emerging trends have drawn substantial attention to training-phase attacks, particularly backdoor attacks. Such attacks implant hidden trigger patterns (e.g., tones, environmental sounds) into the model during training, thereby manipulating the model's predictions in the inference phase. However, existing backdoor attacks can be easily undermined in practice as the inserted triggers are audible. Users may notice such attacks when listening to the training data and remaining alert for suspicious sounds. In this work, we present a novel audio backdoor attack that exploits completely inaudible triggers in the frequency domain of the audio spectrograms. Specifically, we optimize the trigger to be a frequency-domain pattern with the energy below the noise floor (e.g., background and hardware noises) at any given frequency, thereby rendering the trigger inaudible. To realize such attacks, we design a strategy that automatically generates inaudible triggers in the spectrum supported by commodity playback devices (e.g., smartphones and laptops). We further develop optimization techniques to enhance the trigger's robustness against speech content and onset variations. Experiments on hotword and speaker recognition indicate that our attack can achieve attack success rates of more than 98.2% and 81.0% under digital and physical attack scenarios. The results also demonstrate the trigger's inaudibility with a Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) less than -3.54 dB against background noises. We further verify that our attack can successfully bypass state-of-the-art backdoor defense strategies based on learning and audio processing.

26 November 2024
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
HPHuy Phan
Huy Phan
JXJinqi Xiao
Jinqi Xiao
YSYang Sui
Yang Sui
TZTianfang Zhang
Tianfang Zhang
ZTZijie Tang
Zijie Tang
BYBo Yuan
Bo Yuan