16 January 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Reactive power compensation is an important challenge in smart power systems. However, in the context of reactive power compensation, most existing studies assume that customers can assess their compensation value (their Var unit) objectively. In this paper, customers are assumed to make decisions that pertain to reactive power coordination. In consequence, the way in which those customers evaluate the compensation value resulting from their individual decisions will impact the overall grid performance. In particular, a behavioral framework, based on the framing effect of prospect theory (PT), is developed to study the impact of both objective value and subjective evaluation in a reactive power compensation game. For instance, PT's framing effect allows customers to optimize a subjective value of their utility which essentially frames the objective utility with respect to a reference point. This game enables customers to coordinate the use of their electrical devices to compensate reactive power. For the proposed game, both the objective case using expected utility theory and the PT consideration are solved via a learning algorithm that converges to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, several key properties of this game are derived analytically. Simulation results show that, under PT, customers are likely to make decisions that differ from those predicted by classical models. For instance, using an illustrative two-customer case, we show that a PT customer will increase the adoption of a conservative strategy (achieving a high power factor) by 29% compared to a conventional customer. Similar insights are also observed for a case with three customers.