19 July 2021 in npj Science of Learning
Chinese students are more likely than US students to hold a malleable view of success in school, yet are more likely to hold fixed mindsets about intelligence. We demonstrate that this apparently contradictory pattern of cross-cultural differences holds true across multiple samples and is related to how students conceptualize intelligence and its relationship with academic achievement. Study 1 (N > 15,000) confirmed that US students endorsed more growth mindsets than Chinese students. Importantly, US students’ mathematics grades were positively related to growth mindsets with a medium-to-large effect, but for Chinese students, this association was slightly negative. Study 2 conceptually replicated Study 1 findings with US and Chinese college samples, and further discovered that cross-cultural differences in intelligence mindset beliefs corresponded to how students defined intelligence. Together, these studies demonstrated systematic cross-cultural differences in intelligence mindset and suggest that intelligence mindsets are not necessarily associated with academic motivation or success in the same way across cultures.
8 May 2023 in npj Science of Learning
17 December 2025 in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Executive functions (EFs) develop dramatically across childhood and predict important outcomes, including academic achievement. These links are often attributed to individual differences in EF capacities. However, individual difference accounts underemphasize contextual influences on EF. We propose a complementary perspective, the adaptive habits framework, which emphasizes how contextual factors support or hinder EF engagement in children. Contexts that support repeated EF engagement establish habits for engaging EF in similar contexts and in similar ways. Such habits, in turn, reduce the effort associated with engaging EF and thus increase the likelihood of deciding to engage EF in the future. We interpret empirical findings through the lens of adaptive habits, discuss the implications of this framework, and propose novel research approaches and interventions to support EF in children.
4 March 2024 in Psychological Science
People often rely on scientific findings to help them make decisions—however, failing to report effect magnitudes might lead to a potential bias in assuming findings are practically significant. Across two online studies (Prolific; N = 800), we measured U.S. adults’ endorsements of expensive interventions described in media reports that led to effects that were small, large, or of unreported magnitude between groups. Participants who viewed interventions with unreported effect magnitudes were more likely to endorse interventions compared with those who viewed interventions with small effects and were just as likely to endorse interventions as those who viewed interventions with large effects, suggesting a practical significance bias. When effect magnitudes were reported, participants on average adjusted their evaluations accordingly. However, some individuals, such as those with low numeracy skills, were more likely than others to act on small effects, even when explicitly prompted to first consider the meaningfulness of the effect.
25 January 2024 in Journal of Personality Assessment
Our well-being can improve when people heed evidence rather than simply follow familiar or charismatic advisors who neglect evidence. We developed the Reasoning through Evidence versus Advice (EvA) scale to measure individual differences in reasoning through evidence like science and statistics versus following advisors such as politicians and celebrities. No existing scales directly measure these tendencies; moreover, it was theoretically unknown whether they reflect a single dimension (from evidence- to advice-based) or distinct tendencies to value or distrust each. Our scale validation process included qualitative interviews and four studies that involved 1583 respondents (753 college graduates, 830 non-college graduates) in which we conducted exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses and tests of convergent validity, discriminant validity, and measurement invariance by gender and education. This process yielded a 16-item EvA scale with four dimensions: Pro-evidence, Anti-evidence, Pro-advice, and Anti-advice. In assessing criterion validity, these tendencies identified individual differences in important, real-world attitudes and behaviors, including susceptibility to health misinformation, adherence to CDC guidelines on social distancing, confidence in the COVID vaccine, science curiosity, and religiosity. The EvA scale extends our understanding of individual differences in reasoning tendencies that shape critical attitudes, decisions, and behaviors and can help promote informed decisions.
1 June 2022 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
Media articles often communicate the latest scientific findings, and readers must evaluate the evidence and consider its potential implications. Prior work has found that the inclusion of graphs makes messages about scientific data more persuasive (Tal & Wansink, 2016). One explanation for this finding is that such visualizations evoke the notion of "science"; however, results are mixed. In the current investigation we extend this work by examining whether graphs lead people to erroneously infer causation from correlational data. In two experiments we gave participants realistic online news articles in which they were asked to evaluate the research and apply the work's findings to a real-life hypothetical scenario. Participants were assigned to read the text of the article alone or with an accompanying line or bar graph. We found no evidence that the presence of graphs affected participants' evaluations of correlational data as causal. Given that these findings were unexpected, we attempted to directly replicate a well-cited article making the claim that graphs are persuasive (Tal & Wansink, 2016), but we were unsuccessful. Overall, our results suggest that the mere presence of graphs does not necessarily increase the likelihood that one infers incorrect causal claims.