Rebecca J. Free

Rebecca J. Free

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Rebecca J. Free

Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 April 2023 in Transfusion
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RFRebecca J. Free
Rebecca J. Free
MSMathew R. P. Sapiano
Mathew R. P. Sapiano
JOJoel L. Chavez Ortiz
Joel L. Chavez Ortiz
PSPhylicia Stewart
Phylicia Stewart
JBJames Berger
James Berger
SBSridhar V. Basavaraju
Sridhar V. Basavaraju

13 September 2023 in Transfusion
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IKIan Kracalik
Ian Kracalik
MSMathew R. P. Sapiano
Mathew R. P. Sapiano
RWRobert C. Wild
Robert C. Wild
JOJoel Chavez Ortiz
Joel Chavez Ortiz
PSPhylicia Stewart
Phylicia Stewart
RFRebecca J. Free
Rebecca J. Free

2 May 2022 in Open Forum Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
RFRebecca J Free
Rebecca J Free
PAPallavi Annambhotla
Pallavi Annambhotla
RHRicardo M La Hoz
Ricardo M La Hoz
LDLara Danziger-Isakov
Lara Danziger-Isakov
JJJefferson M Jones
Jefferson M Jones
IKIan T Kracalik
Ian T Kracalik
Background: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is transmissible through lung transplantation, and outcomes among infected organ recipients may be severe. Transmission risk to extrapulmonary organ recipients and recent (within 30 days of transplantation) SARS-CoV-2–infected recipient outcomes are unclear. Methods: During March 2020–March 2021, potential SARS-CoV-2 transmissions through solid organ transplantation were investigated. Assessments included SARS-CoV-2 testing, medical record review, determination of likely transmission route, and recent recipient outcomes. Results: During March 2020–March 2021, approximately 42 740 organs were transplanted in the United States. Forty donors, who donated 140 organs to 125 recipients, were investigated. Nine (23%) donors and 25 (20%) recipients were SARS-CoV-2 positive by nucleic acid amplification test (NAAT). Most (22/25 [88%]) SARS-CoV-2–infected recipients had healthcare or community exposures. Nine SARS-CoV-2–infected donors donated 21 organs to 19 recipients. Of these, 3 lung recipients acquired SARS-CoV-2 infections from donors with negative SARS-CoV-2 testing of pretransplant upper respiratory tract specimens but from whom posttransplant lower respiratory tract (LRT) specimens were SARS-CoV-2 positive. Sixteen recipients of extrapulmonary organs from SARS-CoV-2–infected donors had no evidence of posttransplant COVID-19. All-cause mortality within 45 days after transplantation was 6-fold higher among SARS-CoV-2–infected recipients (9/25 [36%]) than those without (6/100 [6%]). Conclusions: Transplant-transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is uncommon. Pretransplant NAAT of lung donor LRT specimens may prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through transplantation. Extrapulmonary organs from SARS-CoV-2–infected donors may be safely usable, although further study is needed. Reducing recent recipient exposures to SARS-CoV-2 should remain a focus of prevention.

15 September 2023 in American Journal of Transplantation
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KMKristen E. Marshall
Kristen E. Marshall
RFRebecca J. Free
Rebecca J. Free
TFThomas Daniel Filardo
Thomas Daniel Filardo
NSNoah G. Schwartz
Noah G. Schwartz
AHAlfonso C. Hernandez-Romieu
Alfonso C. Hernandez-Romieu
SBSridhar V. Basavaraju
Sridhar V. Basavaraju
In the United States, there is currently no system to track donated human tissue products to individual recipients. This posed a challenge during an investigation of a nationwide tuberculosis outbreak that occurred when bone allograft contaminated with Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Lot A) was implanted into 113 patients in 18 US states, including 2 patients at 1 health care facility in Colorado. A third patient at the same facility developed spinal tuberculosis with an isolate genetically identical to the Lot A outbreak strain. However, health care records indicated this patient had received bone allograft from a different donor (Lot B). We investigated the source of this newly identified infection, including the possibilities of Lot B donor infection, product switch or contamination during manufacturing, product switch at the health care facility, person-to-person transmission, and laboratory error. The findings included gaps in tissue traceability at the health care facility, creating the possibility for a product switch at the point of care despite detailed tissue-tracking policies. Nationally, 6 (3.9%) of 155 Lot B units could not be traced to final disposition. This investigation highlights the critical need to improve tissue-tracking systems to ensure unbroken traceability, facilitating investigations of recipient adverse events and enabling timely public health responses to prevent morbidity and mortality.

19 July 2019 in MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RFRebecca J. Free
Rebecca J. Free
BBBryan F. Buss
Bryan F. Buss
SKSamir Koirala
Samir Koirala
MUMonica Ulses
Monica Ulses
ACAnna Carlson
Anna Carlson
TSTom Safranek
Tom Safranek
In October 2017, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (NDHHS) was notified by a local health department of a gastrointestinal illness outbreak among attendees of a wedding reception at facility A, an event center. Shortly thereafter, state and local public health officials began receiving reports of similar gastrointestinal illness among attendees of subsequent facility A events. An investigation was initiated to identify cases, establish the cause, assess possible transmission routes, and provide control recommendations. Overall, 159 cases consistent with norovirus infection (three confirmed and 156 probable) were identified among employees of facility A and attendees of nine facility A events during October 27-November 18, 2017. The investigation revealed a public vomiting episode at the facility on October 27 and at least one employee involved with preparing and serving food who returned to work <24 hours after symptom resolution, suggesting that a combination of contaminated environmental surfaces and infected food handlers likely sustained the outbreak. Recommendations regarding sanitation and excluding ill employees were communicated to facility A management. However, facility A performed minimal environmental cleaning and did not exclude ill employees. Consequently, transmission continued. To prevent persistent norovirus outbreaks in similar settings, public health officials should ensure that involved facilities implement a comprehensive prevention strategy as early as possible that includes extensive sanitation and strict exclusion of ill food handlers for at least 48 hours after symptom resolution (1).

1 July 2022 in MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RFRebecca J. Free
Rebecca J. Free
MLMarilyn E. Levi
Marilyn E. Levi
JBJames S. Bowman
James S. Bowman
DBDanae Bixler
Danae Bixler
JBJohn T. Brooks
John T. Brooks
SBSridhar V. Basavaraju
Sridhar V. Basavaraju
This report describes updated public health service guidelines for testing transplant candidates under 12 years of age for HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C.