It is known that a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the McEliece cryptosystem allows an attacker to recover the secret matrix P by measuring the power consumption. We demonstrate that a similar threat is present in the QC-LDPC variant of the McEliece cryptosystem. We consider a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem. We demonstrate that this implementation leaks information about positions of ones in the secret matrix Q. We argue that this leakage allows an attacker to completely recover the matrix Q. In addition, we note that the quasi-cyclic nature of the matrix Q allows to accelerate the attack significantly.
We study a method of computing multiplicative inverses in finite fields using long division. In the case of fields of a prime order p, we construct one fixed integer d(p) with the property that for any nonzero field element a, we can compute its inverse by dividing d(p) by a and by reducing the result modulo p. We show how to construct the smallest d(p) with this property. We demonstrate that a similar approach works in finite fields of a non-prime order, as well. However, we demonstrate that the studied method (in both cases) has worse asymptotic complexity than the extended Euclidean algorithm.
PQC migration represents multiple challenges in education. We will need to educate our future cryptography researchers and engineers on new topics, introduce new challenges, and explain new cryptographic primitives. In the paper, we present our view on education challenges associated with the transition to post-quantum cryptography.