Georg Starke

Georg Starke

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Georg Starke

Technical University of Munich

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2022 in Digital Health
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LOLaura Arbelaez Ossa
Laura Arbelaez Ossa
GSGeorg Starke
Georg Starke
GLGiorgia Lorenzini
Giorgia Lorenzini
JVJulia E Vogt
Julia E Vogt
DSDavid M Shaw
David M Shaw
BEBernice Simone Elger
Bernice Simone Elger
Using artificial intelligence to improve patient care is a cutting-edge methodology, but its implementation in clinical routine has been limited due to significant concerns about understanding its behavior. One major barrier is the explainability dilemma and how much explanation is required to use artificial intelligence safely in healthcare. A key issue is the lack of consensus on the definition of explainability by experts, regulators, and healthcare professionals, resulting in a wide variety of terminology and expectations. This paper aims to fill the gap by defining minimal explainability standards to serve the views and needs of essential stakeholders in healthcare. In that sense, we propose to define minimal explainability criteria that can support doctors’ understanding, meet patients’ needs, and fulfill legal requirements. Therefore, explainability need not to be exhaustive but sufficient for doctors and patients to comprehend the artificial intelligence models’ clinical implications and be integrated safely into clinical practice. Thus, minimally acceptable standards for explainability are context-dependent and should respond to the specific need and potential risks of each clinical scenario for a responsible and ethical implementation of artificial intelligence.

18 June 2021 in Bioethics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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GSGeorg Starke
Georg Starke
RBRik van Den Brule
Rik van Den Brule
BEBernice Simone Elger
Bernice Simone Elger
PHPim Haselager
Pim Haselager

19 February 2025 in Journal of Medical Internet Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
GSGeorg Starke
Georg Starke
FGFelix Gille
Felix Gille
ATAlberto Termine
Alberto Termine
YAYves Saint James Aquino
Yves Saint James Aquino
RCRicardo Chavarriaga
Ricardo Chavarriaga
MIMarcello Ienca
Marcello Ienca
Background: The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into health care has become a crucial element in the digital transformation of health systems worldwide. Despite the potential benefits across diverse medical domains, a significant barrier to the successful adoption of AI systems in health care applications remains the prevailing low user trust in these technologies. Crucially, this challenge is exacerbated by the lack of consensus among experts from different disciplines on the definition of trust in AI within the health care sector. Objective: We aimed to provide the first consensus-based analysis of trust in AI in health care based on an interdisciplinary panel of experts from different domains. Our findings can be used to address the problem of defining trust in AI in health care applications, fostering the discussion of concrete real-world health care scenarios in which humans interact with AI systems explicitly. Methods: We used a combination of framework analysis and a 3-step consensus process involving 18 international experts from the fields of computer science, medicine, philosophy of technology, ethics, and social sciences. Our process consisted of a synchronous phase during an expert workshop where we discussed the notion of trust in AI in health care applications, defined an initial framework of important elements of trust to guide our analysis, and agreed on 5 case studies. This was followed by a 2-step iterative, asynchronous process in which the authors further developed, discussed, and refined notions of trust with respect to these specific cases. Results: Our consensus process identified key contextual factors of trust, namely, an AI system’s environment, the actors involved, and framing factors, and analyzed causes and effects of trust in AI in health care. Our findings revealed that certain factors were applicable across all discussed cases yet also pointed to the need for a fine-grained, multidisciplinary analysis bridging human-centered and technology-centered approaches. While regulatory boundaries and technological design features are critical to successful AI implementation in health care, ultimately, communication and positive lived experiences with AI systems will be at the forefront of user trust. Our expert consensus allowed us to formulate concrete recommendations for future research on trust in AI in health care applications. Conclusions: This paper advocates for a more refined and nuanced conceptual understanding of trust in the context of AI in health care. By synthesizing insights into commonalities and differences among specific case studies, this paper establishes a foundational basis for future debates and discussions on trusting AI in health care.

15 June 2020 in Psychological Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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GSGeorg Starke
Georg Starke
ECEva De Clercq
Eva De Clercq
SBStefan Borgwardt
Stefan Borgwardt
BEBernice Simone Elger
Bernice Simone Elger
Recent advances in machine learning (ML) promise far-reaching improvements across medical care, not least within psychiatry. While to date no psychiatric application of ML constitutes standard clinical practice, it seems crucial to get ahead of these developments and address their ethical challenges early on. Following a short general introduction concerning ML in psychiatry, we do so by focusing on schizophrenia as a paradigmatic case. Based on recent research employing ML to further the diagnosis, treatment, and prediction of schizophrenia, we discuss three hypothetical case studies of ML applications with view to their ethical dimensions. Throughout this discussion, we follow the principlist framework by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress to analyse potential problems in detail. In particular, we structure our analysis around their principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy, and justice. We conclude with a call for cautious optimism concerning the implementation of ML in psychiatry if close attention is paid to the particular intricacies of psychiatric disorders and its success evaluated based on tangible clinical benefit for patients.

13 March 2021 in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GSGeorg Starke
Georg Starke
ECEva De Clercq
Eva De Clercq
BEBernice S. Elger
Bernice S. Elger
Machine Learning (ML) is on the rise in medicine, promising improved diagnostic, therapeutic and prognostic clinical tools. While these technological innovations are bound to transform health care, they also bring new ethical concerns to the forefront. One particularly elusive challenge regards discriminatory algorithmic judgements based on biases inherent in the training data. A common line of reasoning distinguishes between justified differential treatments that mirror true disparities between socially salient groups, and unjustified biases which do not, leading to misdiagnosis and erroneous treatment. In the curation of training data this strategy runs into severe problems though, since distinguishing between the two can be next to impossible. We thus plead for a pragmatist dealing with algorithmic bias in healthcare environments. By recurring to a recent reformulation of William James’s pragmatist understanding of truth, we recommend that, instead of aiming at a supposedly objective truth, outcome-based therapeutic usefulness should serve as the guiding principle for assessing ML applications in medicine.

20 October 2022 in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GSGeorg Starke
Georg Starke
MIMarcello Ienca
Marcello Ienca
Artificial intelligence (AI) plays a rapidly increasing role in clinical care. Many of these systems, for instance, deep learning-based applications using multilayered Artificial Neural Nets, exhibit epistemic opacity in the sense that they preclude comprehensive human understanding. In consequence, voices from industry, policymakers, and research have suggested trust as an attitude for engaging with clinical AI systems. Yet, in the philosophical and ethical literature on medical AI, the notion of trust remains fiercely debated. Trust skeptics hold that talking about trust in nonhuman agents constitutes a category error and worry about the concept being misused for ethics washing. Proponents of trust have responded to these worries from various angles, disentangling different concepts and aspects of trust in AI, potentially organized in layers or dimensions. Given the substantial disagreements across these accounts of trust and the important worries about ethics washing, we embrace a diverging strategy here. Instead of aiming for a positive definition of the elements and nature of trust in AI, we proceed ex negativo, that is we look at cases where trust or distrust are misplaced. Comparing these instances with trust expedited in doctor–patient relationships, we systematize these instances and propose a taxonomy of both misplaced trust and distrust. By inverting the perspective and focusing on negative examples, we develop an account that provides useful ethical constraints for decisions in clinical as well as regulatory contexts and that highlights how we should not engage with medical AI.