1 November 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
The Global History Register (GHR), an essential component of the Conditional Branch Predictor (CBP) in modern processors, has become a popular attack target because it stores recent branch histories including sensitive kernel control flow information. State-of-the-art GHR attacks can successfully extract bits stored in the GHR, inferring branch directions of executed conditional branch instructions, with conditions linked to secrets. However, retrieving GHR bits requires knowledge of the victim’s virtual address layout. Advancements in enhanced kernel address isolation techniques have significantly reduced the risk of these GHR attacks. In this paper, we introduce GHLeaker, a novel control-flow-based side-channel attack (SCA) that does not rely on kernel address knowledge. GHLeaker retrieves GHR branch information by correlating different branches, effectively bypassing kernel address isolation. We applied GHLeaker to attack Intel, AMD, and ARM processors, demonstrating that all these mainstream processors are vulnerable to the attack. On these platforms, GHLeaker successfully extracts secrets from the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Montgomery ladder algorithm which is widely used in cryptography systems such as RSA.