Zikang Tao

Zikang Tao

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Zikang Tao

Harbin Institute of Technology

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 November 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RSRihui Sun
Rihui Sun
JWJin Wu
Jin Wu
HLHanyin Liu
Hanyin Liu
ZTZikang Tao
Zikang Tao
JDJian Dong
Jian Dong
GQGang Qu
Gang Qu
The Global History Register (GHR), an essential component of the Conditional Branch Predictor (CBP) in modern processors, has become a popular attack target because it stores recent branch histories including sensitive kernel control flow information. State-of-the-art GHR attacks can successfully extract bits stored in the GHR, inferring branch directions of executed conditional branch instructions, with conditions linked to secrets. However, retrieving GHR bits requires knowledge of the victim’s virtual address layout. Advancements in enhanced kernel address isolation techniques have significantly reduced the risk of these GHR attacks. In this paper, we introduce GHLeaker, a novel control-flow-based side-channel attack (SCA) that does not rely on kernel address knowledge. GHLeaker retrieves GHR branch information by correlating different branches, effectively bypassing kernel address isolation. We applied GHLeaker to attack Intel, AMD, and ARM processors, demonstrating that all these mainstream processors are vulnerable to the attack. On these platforms, GHLeaker successfully extracts secrets from the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Montgomery ladder algorithm which is widely used in cryptography systems such as RSA.