1 October 2002 in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocity relationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negative welfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. We separate the influences of these factors in an experiment. In a two‐player game, reciprocation is economically inefficient through negative externalities. A control treatment without externalities is also conducted. In a third, so‐called sudden death treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusion from the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocity can establish bribery relationships, where negative externalities have no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reduces corruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.
1 March 2010 in American Economic Review
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency. (JEL C72, D74, H41)
1 June 2006 in Experimental Economics
This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences with our 18 independent observations per treatment. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects’ interpretation of the task.
1 December 2009 in Economics Letters
1 November 2004 in European Journal of Political Economy
1 June 2000 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization