Sophie Sowden-Carvalho

Sophie Sowden-Carvalho

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Sophie Sowden-Carvalho

School of Psychology University of Birmingham Birmingham UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 December 2022 in Autism Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CKConnor Tom Keating
Connor Tom Keating
LHLydia Hickman
Lydia Hickman
JLJoan Leung
Joan Leung
RMRuth Monk
Ruth Monk
AMAlicia Montgomery
Alicia Montgomery
SSSophie Sowden
Sophie Sowden
Over the past two decades, there have been increasing discussions around which terms should be used to talk about autism. Whilst these discussions have largely revolved around the suitability of identity‐first language and person‐first language, more recently this debate has broadened to encompass other autism‐related terminology (e.g., ‘high‐functioning’). To date, academic studies have not investigated the language preferences of autistic individuals outside of the United Kingdom or Australia, nor have they compared levels of endorsement across countries. Hence, the current study adopted a mixed‐methods approach, employing both quantitative and qualitative techniques, to explore the linguistic preferences of 654 English‐speaking autistic adults across the globe. Despite variation in levels of endorsement between countries, we found that the most popular terms were similar—the terms ‘Autism’, ‘Autistic person’, ‘Is autistic’, ‘Neurological/Brain Difference’, ‘Differences’, ‘Challenges’, ‘Difficulties’, ‘Neurotypical people’, and ‘Neurotypicals’ were consistently favored across countries. Despite relative consensus across groups, both our quantitative and qualitative data demonstrate that there is no universally accepted way to talk about autism. Our thematic analysis revealed the reasons underlying participants’ preferences, generating six core themes, and illuminated an important guiding principle—to respect personal preferences. These findings have significant implications for informing practice, research and language policy worldwide.

1 August 2021 in Emotion
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SSSophie Sowden
Sophie Sowden
BSBianca A. Schuster
Bianca A. Schuster
CKConnor T. Keating
Connor T. Keating
DFDagmar S. Fraser
Dagmar S. Fraser
JCJennifer L. Cook
Jennifer L. Cook
The kinematics of peoples' body movements provide useful cues about emotional states: for example, angry movements are typically fast and sad movements slow. Unlike the body movement literature, studies of facial expressions have focused on spatial, rather than kinematic, cues. This series of experiments demonstrates that speed comprises an important facial emotion expression cue. In Experiments 1a-1c we developed (N = 47) and validated (N = 27) an emotion-induction procedure, and recorded (N = 42) posed and spontaneous facial expressions of happy, angry, and sad emotional states. Our novel analysis pipeline quantified the speed of changes in distance between key facial landmarks. We observed that happy expressions were fastest, sad were slowest, and angry expressions were intermediate. In Experiment 2 (N = 67) we replicated our results for posed expressions and introduced a novel paradigm to index communicative emotional expressions. Across Experiments 1 and 2, we demonstrate differences between posed, spontaneous, and communicative expression contexts. Whereas mouth and eyebrow movements reliably distinguished emotions for posed and communicative expressions, only eyebrow movements were reliable for spontaneous expressions. In Experiments 3 and 4 we manipulated facial expression speed and demonstrated a quantifiable change in emotion recognition accuracy. That is, in a discovery (N = 29) and replication sample (N = 41), we showed that speeding up facial expressions promotes anger and happiness judgments, and slowing down expressions encourages sad judgments. This influence of kinematics on emotion recognition is dissociable from the influence of spatial cues. These studies demonstrate that the kinematics of facial movements provide added value, and an independent contribution to emotion recognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

20 March 2024 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CKConnor Tom Keating
Connor Tom Keating
LHLydia Hickman
Lydia Hickman
PGPhilippine Geelhand
Philippine Geelhand
TTToru Takahashi
Toru Takahashi
JLJoan Leung
Joan Leung
SSSophie Sowden-Carvalho
Sophie Sowden-Carvalho
Recent findings suggest that stigma and camouflaging contribute to mental health difficulties for autistic individuals, however, this evidence is largely based on UK samples. While studies have shown cross-cultural differences in levels of autism-related stigma, it is unclear whether camouflaging and mental health difficulties vary across cultures. Hence, the current study had two aims: (1) to determine whether significant relationships between autism acceptance, camouflaging, and mental health difficulties replicate in a cross-cultural sample of autistic adults, and (2) to compare these variables across cultures. To fulfil these aims, 306 autistic adults from eight countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States) completed a series of online questionnaires. We found that external acceptance and personal acceptance were associated with lower levels of depression but not camouflaging or stress. Higher camouflaging was associated with elevated levels of depression, anxiety, and stress. Significant differences were found across countries in external acceptance, personal acceptance, depression, anxiety, and stress, even after controlling for relevant covariates. Levels of camouflaging also differed across countries however this effect became non-significant after controlling for the covariates. These findings have significant implications, identifying priority regions for anti-stigma interventions, and highlighting countries where greater support for mental health difficulties is needed.

15 March 2022 in eLife
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ARAlicia J Rybicki
Alicia J Rybicki
SSSophie L Sowden
Sophie L Sowden
BSBianca Schuster
Bianca Schuster
JCJennifer L Cook
Jennifer L Cook
Some theories of human cultural evolution posit that humans have social-specific learning mechanisms that are adaptive specialisations moulded by natural selection to cope with the pressures of group living. However, the existence of neurochemical pathways that are specialised for learning from social information and individual experience is widely debated. Cognitive neuroscientific studies present mixed evidence for social-specific learning mechanisms: some studies find dissociable neural correlates for social and individual learning, whereas others find the same brain areas and, dopamine-mediated, computations involved in both. Here, we demonstrate that, like individual learning, social learning is modulated by the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist haloperidol when social information is the primary learning source, but not when it comprises a secondary, additional element. Two groups (total N = 43) completed a decision-making task which required primary learning, from own experience, and secondary learning from an additional source. For one group, the primary source was social, and secondary was individual; for the other group this was reversed. Haloperidol affected primary learning irrespective of social/individual nature, with no effect on learning from the secondary source. Thus, we illustrate that dopaminergic mechanisms underpinning learning can be dissociated along a primary-secondary but not a social-individual axis. These results resolve conflict in the literature and support an expanding field showing that, rather than being specialised for particular inputs, neurochemical pathways in the human brain can process both social and non-social cues and arbitrate between the two depending upon which cue is primarily relevant for the task at hand.

10 May 2022 in PsyArXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
CKConnor Tom Keating
Connor Tom Keating
LHLydia Hickman
Lydia Hickman
JLJoan Leung
Joan Leung
RMRuth Monk
Ruth Monk
AMAlicia Montgomery
Alicia Montgomery
SSSophie Sowden-Carvalho
Sophie Sowden-Carvalho
Over the past two decades, there have been increasing discussions around which terms should be used to talk about autism. Whilst these discussions have largely revolved around the suitability of identity-first language and person-first language, more recently this debate has broadened to encompass other autism-related terminology (e.g., “high-functioning”). To date, academic studies have not investigated the language preferences of autistic individuals outside of the UK or Australia, nor have they compared levels of endorsement across countries. Hence, the current study adopted a mixed-methods approach, employing both quantitative and qualitative techniques, to explore the linguistic preferences of 654 English-speaking autistic adults across the globe. Despite variation in levels of endorsement between countries, we found that the most popular terms were similar- the terms “‘Autism”, “Autistic person”, “Is autistic”, “Neurological/Brain Difference”, “Differences”, “Challenges”, “Difficulties”, “Neurotypical people”, and “Neurotypicals” were consistently favored across countries. Despite relative consensus across groups, both our quantitative and qualitative data demonstrate that there is no universally accepted way to talk about autism. Our thematic analysis revealed the reasons underlying participants’ preferences, generating six core themes, and illuminated an important guiding principle- to respect personal preferences. These findings have significant implications for informing practice, research and language policy worldwide.

8 October 2021 in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SSSophie Sowden
Sophie Sowden
DKDivyush Khemka
Divyush Khemka
CCCaroline Catmur
Caroline Catmur
There is evidence that humans mirror others’ emotional responses: brain responses to observed and experienced emotion overlap, and reaction time costs of observing others’ pain suggest that others’ emotional states interfere with our own. Such emotional mirroring requires regulation to prevent personal distress. However, currently it is unclear whether this “empathic interference effect” is uniquely social, arising only from the observation of human actors, or also from the observation of non-biological objects in “painful” states. Moreover, the degree to which this interference relates to individual differences in self-reported levels of empathy is yet to be revealed. We introduce a modified pain observation task, measuring empathic interference effects induced by observation of painful states applied to both biological and non-biological stimuli. An initial validation study ( N = 50) confirmed that painful states applied to biological stimuli were rated explicitly as more painful than non-painful states applied to biological stimuli, and also than both painful and non-painful states applied to non-biological stimuli. Subsequently, across two independent discovery ( N = 83) and replication ( N = 80) samples, the task elicited slowing of response times during the observation of painful states when compared to non-painful states, but the magnitude of this effect did not differ between biological and non-biological stimuli. Little evidence was found for reliable relationships between empathic interference and self-reported empathy. Caution should therefore be taken in using the current task to pursue an individual differences approach to empathic interference, but the task shows promise for investigating the specificity of the mechanism involved in regulating emotional mirroring.