12 February 2020 in Security and Communication Networks
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) can support a fine-grained access control to encrypted data. When the user’s secret-key is compromised, the ABE system has to revoke its decryption privileges to prevent the leakage of encrypted data. Although there are many constructions about revocable ABE from bilinear maps, the situation with lattice-based constructions is less satisfactory, and a few efforts were made to close this gap. In this work, we propose the first lattice-based server-aided revocable attribute-based encryption (SR-ABE) scheme and thus the first such construction that is believed to be quantum resistant. In the standard model, our scheme is proved to be secure based on the hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem.
2 July 2020 in Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering
With the rapid development of electronic information technology, digital signature has become an indispensable part of our lives. Traditional public key ce
13 March 2019 in IEEE Access
28 February 2019 in KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems
1 November 2019 in IET Information Security
Attribute‐based encryption (ABE) supports fine‐grained sharing of encrypted data so that it can be used in a plenty of application scenarios, and many constructions of ABE scheme have been presented. The first arithmetic circuit ABE system was proposed by Boneh, Gentry, Gorbunov et al . (BGG + 14) in Eurocrypt 2014. It is one of the major candidates for ABE, whose security is based on the learning with errors assumption. In this work, the authorsanalyse three different versions of BGG + 14 ABE with weak attributes, weak variants, and weak modulus. First, they discuss weak attributes of BGG + 14 ABE. A weak attribute is generated with corresponding decryption key, such that whenever a ciphertext is labelled with this weak attribute, 1 bit of the plaintext can be revealed. Second, they discuss the security of three variants of BGG + 14 ABE with simplified pre‐sampled matrices, and show that all of them are not secure under collusion attack. Third, they consider the composite modulus rather than prime modulus in BGG + 14 ABE scheme. They show that, if a small factor of the modulus is known, the set of users able to decrypt is clearly expanded. These analyses give different perspectives on the security of BGG + 14 ABE under different conditions.
31 December 2024 in International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science