Although images have always been part of politics, research on the visual aspects of political communication recently gained momentum, especially with the spread of social media–based political communication. However, there are still several significant research gaps in this field. The aim of this article is to identify and compare the patterns and effects of Hungarian politicians’ ( n = 51) image-based communication on Facebook ( n = 2,992) and Instagram ( n = 868) during the Hungarian parliamentary election campaign in 2018. By doing so, we shed light on two important dimensions of personalization: individualization and privatization. This work is designed to fill three gaps in the literature. We argue that existing research of visual political communication (1) treats images predominantly as illustrations, (2) is limited to single-platform studies, and (3) does not investigate the engagement effects of images. To move beyond these limitations, this study investigates images as objects of interest on their own; it adopts a cross-platform comparative approach and examines the engagement effects of visual cues by applying a combination of inductive and deductive qualitative content analysis. Our results show that images are often used to personalize communication. While on Facebook the individualization dimension of personalization is more common and popular, on Instagram its privatization dimension prevails. Furthermore, on Facebook, users like more politics-related candidate-centered images, but on Instagram we could not find similar effects for more informal visuals.
Along with the recent boom in support of populist movements in Europe, social media seems to be the ideal place for their interaction with the public. While Facebook has been thoroughly explored for populist campaigning, there is still scarce research on visual aspects of their communication. Analysing the 2019 European Parliament campaign, this study seeks to determine the distinct characteristics of a populist visual communication style and its differences in relation to the non-populist parties. Applying quantitative content analysis to the images ( N = 997) posted on Facebook by political parties from 28 countries enabled us to show that there is a predominance of similarities in both communication styles. Although populists demonstrated a higher propensity to depict their leader and use national symbols, these were exceptions to the overwhelming evidence of uniformity in campaigning methods. Hence, we argue that despite evidence of textual visibility, populist communication does not explicitly manifest through images.
1 October 2023 in Journal of Visual Political Communication
More than ten years ago, Schill’s (2012) review article was published on the visual aspects of political communication aiming to increase research in this field. It seems that scholars have reacted to this call in the last decade. The present article argues that in the last ten years, visual political communication (VPC) has been affected by technological advances, and with the proliferation of the internet and social media, political communication has become even more visual. As Schill’s (2012) article predated this period, a new review seems to be timely. To that end, a combination of a systematic and narrative review is provided to highlight the results and developments in this area. Findings suggest that the rise of social media has brought changes to VPC, which have been reflected in the literature by focusing on key concepts in contemporary political communication: personalization, populism, gender-related issues, and the effects of VPC on citizens, separately on social media and in television.
In this article, we focus on how the issue strategies of political leaders are influenced by an external shock that completely changes the public agenda of the election campaign. The 2022 Hungarian parliamentary election campaign is a unique case to investigate this question, as Russia attacked Ukraine six weeks before the election day (April 3, 2022). The study aims to investigate whether the campaign’s issue strategies changed due to this shocking event, and if so, what are the main directions of the changes. The examination relies on a manual content analysis of Hungarian party leaders’ Facebook posts during the campaign, covering both the period before and after the outbreak of the war. First, based on the literature, we distinguish between different issue strategies such as issue ownership, issue stealing, “riding the wave,” and multi-issue and issue-poor strategies. We categorize political leaders’ issue strategies based on their issue focus before and after the external shock. Our results show that while war, economy, and foreign policy play a greater role in the communication of most political actors after February 24, there are remarkable differences between political actors. The communication of opposition party leaders seems to persist with their original issue strategies (issue-poor and multi-issue campaigns), while Viktor Orbán clearly changed his focus immediately after the invasion of Ukraine and ran a “riding the wave” campaign with a focus on war.
This study investigates the strategic use of visual and verbal disinformation by astroturf political influencers for negative campaigning and political mobilization. Focusing on the case of the 2022 national election campaign in Hungary, the research examines how seemingly grassroots influencers, who conceal affiliations with political actors, engage in astroturfing, a deceptive communication tactic involving the dissemination of fabricated or misleading information. Specifically, the analysis centers on the content produced by Megafon, a prominent astroturf influencer network on Facebook, the dominant platform for political communication in Hungary. To address the research questions, a total of 2,655 Facebook posts were analyzed using manual quantitative content analysis. The dataset comprises both visual and verbal content, with a particular focus on negative campaigning and political mobilization. The findings indicate that disinformation is deeply embedded in both the textual and visual dimensions of astroturf content, with visual disinformation being more prevalent than purely textual. A recurring tactic identified is decontextualization, where genuine visuals are paired with misleading commentary, thereby distorting meaning and intent. Visuals are frequently used to misrepresent opponents’ actions and mobilize supporters under false pretenses. These strategies are deployed without transparent disclosure of influencers’ political connections, blurring the boundaries between organic activity and coordinated political communication. By analyzing these manipulative practices, the study emphasizes the urgent need to recognize astroturf visual disinformation as a potent instrument for undermining democratic discourse and highlights the critical role of social media as a battleground for political manipulation in contemporary electoral contexts.
This paper examines which types of political communication strategies are more likely to be negatively framed by journalists. For political actors, the risk of negative framing is significant: while their statements may reach readers, journalists’ negative interpretations can alter the intended context and meaning. To explore the message-related factors influencing journalists’ negative framing, we analyze data from the second wave of the Comparative Campaign Dynamics project, a cross-national study encompassing manual content analysis of newspaper articles from 16 general election campaigns across 10 European countries. Political actors’ statements are classified into six categories based on two dimensions. The first distinguishes between self-directed and other-directed messages. The second categorizes statements as (a) policy issue-related, (b) character assessments, or (c) character assessments based on issue positions or performance. Our findings reveal that journalists are more likely to negatively frame self-directed statements by political actors, while other-directed and negative campaign messages are more often reported neutrally. This suggests that negative messages not only attract media attention more effectively but also reach voters with minimal distortion from journalists’ negative evaluations. Additionally, journalists appear more critical of parties’ self-assessments than their issue-related statements, reflecting their tendency to challenge political actors’ character evaluations.