Jacob Huckelberry

Jacob Huckelberry

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Jacob Huckelberry

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 February 2026 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJacob Huckelberry
Jacob Huckelberry
YZYuke Zhang
Yuke Zhang
ASAllison Sansone
Allison Sansone
JMJames Mickens
James Mickens
PBPeter Anthony Beerel
Peter Anthony Beerel
VRVijay Janapa Reddi
Vijay Janapa Reddi
Tiny Machine Learning (TinyML) enables machine learning inference on microcontrollers with kilobytes of memory and megahertz processors, two to three orders of magnitude more constrained than conventional edge devices. These extreme limitations render traditional security measures impractical, yet the security implications remain underexplored. Our systematic literature review reveals that fewer than 5% of TinyML publications address security concerns, with even fewer focusing on TinyML-specific vulnerabilities, a critical gap as these devices proliferate in safety-critical applications including healthcare monitoring, autonomous systems, and industrial control. This paper provides a comprehensive security survey specifically addressing TinyML’s resource constraints and unique threat landscape. We develop a resource-based device taxonomy distinguishing IoT, EdgeML, and TinyML security capabilities; formulate a TinyML-specific threat model identifying physical and remote attack vectors; systematically analyze eleven attack classes across hardware, software, and model layers; and assess threat severity using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). For each attack, we evaluate whether conventional countermeasures are feasible under TinyML constraints by assessing computational overhead, memory requirements, and practical deployability on representative platforms. Our analysis reveals critical gaps where existing defenses impose prohibitive overhead, requiring new lightweight solutions. We conclude by identifying open research challenges specific to securing resource-constrained machine learning systems, providing a roadmap for future work.

23 February 2026 in IEEE Micro
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JHJacob Huckelberry
Jacob Huckelberry
AGAndrea Mattia Garavagno
Andrea Mattia Garavagno
YZYuke Zhang
Yuke Zhang
PBPeter Anthony Beerel
Peter Anthony Beerel
JMJames Mickens
James Mickens
VRVijay Janapa Reddi
Vijay Janapa Reddi
Most TinyML hardware focus on supporting Quantized Neural Networks (QNNs) to meet stringent constraints on power consumption, size, and cost. Despite this, the security aspects of quantization within TinyML hardware remain largely unexplored. Although previous studies indicate that QNNs demonstrate similar or enhanced robustness when compared to full-precision Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) against typical evasion attacks, no attack strategies tailored specifically for TinyML hardware have been proposed yet. This paper addresses the aforementioned shortfall by demonstrating how a two-step attack pipeline can surpass the current state-of-the-art in the QNN context and shows the need for more hardware-aware security research.