Actuator placement is an active field of research which has received significant attention for its applications in complex dynamical networks. In this paper, we study the problem of finding a set of actuator placements minimizing the metric that measures the average energy consumed for state transfer by the controller, while satisfying a structural controllability requirement and a cardinality constraint on the number of actuators allowed. As no computationally efficient methods are known to solve such combinatorial set function optimization problems, two greedy algorithms, forward and reverse, are proposed to obtain approximate solutions. We first show that the constraint sets these algorithms explore can be characterized by matroids. We then obtain performance guarantees for the forward and reverse greedy algorithms applied to the general class of matroid optimization problems by exploiting properties of the objective function such as the submodularity ratio and the curvature. Finally, we propose feasibility check methods for both algorithms based on maximum flow problems on certain auxiliary graphs originating from the network graph. Our results are verified with case studies over large networks.

This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Our results are verified with several case studies based on electricity market data.