1 June 2021 in Journal of Environmental Management
23 January 2018 in Empirical Economics
26 February 2021 in Asia Pacific Journal of Management
15 November 2022 in The World Economy
This paper examines the extent to which host‐country institutions influence the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth. We develop a theoretical model to analyse how different types of institutions condition the FDI‐growth relationship and use various institutional proxies to conduct threshold estimations on panel data for 51 developed and developing countries over the period 1991–2016. Our results consistently reveal a robust, contingent effect of political stability on the FDI‐growth nexus, suggesting that, among all the institutional factors considered, the absence of civil conflict or violence in the host economy is most critical in terms of yielding both direct and indirect growth‐enhancing benefits associated with technology transfer and spillover effects from FDI inflows. This finding is pertinent to both developed and developing countries, although the threshold level of political stability required to achieve sizeable growth benefits from FDI tends to be lower for developing countries.
9 October 2020 in International Journal of Finance & Economics
8 February 2024 in Cross Cultural & Strategic Management
Purpose: This paper builds upon managerial discretion literature to study the relationship between foreign ownership and bribery intensity.Design/methodology/approach: Building on World Bank’s data of 9,386 firms from 125 countries over the period 2006–2018, this paper uses Tobit regression, ordered probit and logit models to empirically test the hypotheses.Findings: This paper finds that firms have higher bribery intensity when executives have a higher level of managerial discretion. Smaller firms with slack financial resources tend to bribe more when they face more government intervention, munificent and uncertain industrial environment.Originality/value: Extant corruption literature has addressed the effects of external institutional settings and internal corporate governance on bribery offering among multinational enterprises (MNEs). How much, and under what condition do top executives matter in bribery activities are yet to be answered. This paper integrates the concept of managerial discretion with corruption and bribery literature and offers a potential answer to the above question. In addition, prior corruption and bribery literature have primarily studied bribery through either micro- or macro-level analysis. This paper adopts multiple-level of analyses and elucidates the foreign ownership and bribery relationship from the organizational and industrial levels.