17 October 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
The wide deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has given rise to strong demands for optimizing their inference performance. Today’s techniques serving this purpose primarily focus on reducing latency and improving throughput through algorithmic and hardware enhancements, while largely overlooking their privacy side effects, particularly in a multi-user environment. In our research, for the first time, we discovered a set of new timing side channels in LLM systems, arising from shared caches and GPU memory allocations, which can be exploited to infer both confidential system prompts and those issued by other users. These vulnerabilities echo security challenges observed in traditional computing systems, highlighting an urgent need to address potential information leakage in LLM serving infrastructures. In this paper, we report novel attack strategies designed to exploit such timing side channels inherent in LLM deployments, specifically targeting the Key-Value (KV) cache and semantic cache widely used to enhance LLM inference performance. Our approach leverages timing measurements and classification models to detect cache hits, allowing an adversary to infer private prompts with high accuracy. We also propose a token-by-token search algorithm to efficiently recover shared prompt prefixes in the caches, showing the feasibility of stealing system prompts and those produced by peer users. Our experimental studies on black-box testing of popular online LLM services demonstrate that such privacy risks are completely realistic, with significant consequences. Our findings underscore the need for robust mitigation to protect LLM systems against such emerging threats.
10 January 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
With frequent software-induced activations on DRAM rows, bit flips can occur on their physically adjacent rows (i.e., RowHammer). Existing studies leverage FPGA platforms to characterize RowHammer, which have identified key factors that contribute to RowHammer bit flips, e.g., data pattern. As the FPGA-based studies have removed the interference of the OS and the memory controller, their findings on the identified contributing factors do not always work as reported in a real-world computing system, resulting in negative effects on system-level RowHammer attacks and defenses. In this paper, we carry out a system-level empirical study on factors from both the software side and the DRAM side that contribute to RowHammer. We conduct the study on 33 DRAM modules including both DDR4 and DDR3, with 292 DRAM chips from various vendors. Our experimental results from the software side show that some prior findings about existing factors are inconsistent with our observations, thus not applicable to a real-world system. Also, we contribute to identifying one new factor that effectively affects RowHammer bit flips. Our DRAM-side results identify three types of new contributing factors and indicate that DRAM modules are more vulnerable if they achieve better performance and lower power consumption. Particularly, Intel XMP, intended for improving DRAM performance, might be abused for RowHammer attacks.