19 December 2022 in Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology Part C: Toxicology & Pharmacology
22 February 2024 in Naval Research Logistics (NRL)
12 October 2022 in Kybernetes
Purpose: Existing literature demonstrates the important role of information transparency in enterprise development and market surveillance. However, little empirical research has examined the information transparency effect in supply chain management. This study aims to fill this gap by exploring the significant role of information transparency on supply chain financing and its mechanism, taking trade credit as the starting point.Design/methodology/approach: From the data set comprising 3,880 Chinese firms with A-shares listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges from 2011 to 2020, we obtain the basic picture of information transparency and trade credit. Panel fixed effects regression is used to test the hypotheses concerning the antecedents to trade credit.Findings: The empirical results show that: first, information transparency can significantly support corporate access to trade credit and is found to facilitate financing by mitigating perceived risk. Second, among companies with higher levels of financing constraints, weaker market power and more concentration of suppliers, information transparency promotes trade credit more markedly. Third, the outbreak of COVID-19 causes a substantial increase in uncertainty and risk in external circumstances and then the effect of information transparency is weakened. Fourth, the contribution to trade credit is likely to be stronger for disclosures containing management transparency elements compared to single financial transparency.Originality/value: To the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the first to explore the positive role of information transparency to supply chain financing, which to a certain extent makes up for the lack of information transparency research in the supply chain. It provides new ideas for enterprises to obtain trade credit financing and promote the improvement of supervision departments’ disclosure policies.
2 June 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
In today’s increasingly interconnected world, the platform owning the private label product (PL product) has formed a cocompetition relationship with the manufacturer, which may affect its recommendation strategy. Considering consumers’ limited awareness and relative preference, a game model is established to study the impacts of the platform’s recommendation strategy on pricing, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We demonstrate that consumer preference does not absolutely determine the platform’s recommendation strategy. When consumers prefer the manufacturer’s product (MB product), the platform recommends the PL product if the commission rate is low; otherwise, it recommends the MB product. When consumers prefer the PL product, the platform is willing to recommend the MB product only if the PL product’s valuation is not too large and the commission rate is high. By contrast, the manufacturer always prefers the MB product to be recommended. Furthermore, the recommendation strategy selection has different effects on different types of consumers. Although uninformed consumers always prefer the high-value product to be recommended, informed consumers may prefer the platform to recommend the low-value product. More importantly, the platform can achieve Pareto improvement by providing paid recommendation service, benefiting itself and the manufacturer. We also extend our model to conduct further analyses (e.g., differentiated consumer awareness levels, positive production cost, and corporate social responsibility), which examines the robustness of our results. Our study helps to explain the market practices and provides valuable guidelines for platform encroachment and recommendation decisions.
27 October 2022 in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
1 January 2023 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
With the development of business, more consumers are quality sensitive and improving the product quality becomes particularly important. We mainly discuss two investment strategies: retailer-investment and platform-investment. Compared with non-investment case, only if consumer sensitivity is not too high, it is profitable for the retailer to select retailer-investment. When both retailer-investment and platform-investment are viable, the choice of investment mechanism depends on the profit-sharing ratio. Particularly, if the ratio is within a certain range, the optimal investment strategy is platform-investment, achieving a triple-win outcome. Besides, to effectively alleviate the contradiction between the retailer's moral hazard problem and the sustainable value-added effect of platform-investment, we further research the contract term. These results give us some meaningful management inspirations in investment mechanism.