18 June 2008 in Molecular Psychiatry
This is the author's version of an article subsequently published in Molecular Psychiatry. The final published version is available at: http://www.nature.com/mp/journal/v13/n7/full/mp200847a.htm
2 April 2009 in Philosophical Psychology
“Altered State of Consciousness” (ASC) has been defined as a changed overall pattern of conscious experience, or as the subjective feeling and explicit recognition that one's own subjective experience has changed. We argue that these traditional definitions fail to draw a clear line between altered and normal states of consciousness (NSC). We outline a new definition of ASC and argue that the proper way to understand the concept of ASC is to regard it as a representational notion: the alteration that has happened is not an alteration of consciousness (or subjective experience) per se, but an alteration in the informational or representational relationships between consciousness and the world. An altered state of consciousness is defined as a state in which the neurocognitive background mechanisms of consciousness have an increased tendency to produce misrepresentations such as hallucinations, delusions, and memory distortions. Paradigm examples of such generally misrepresentational, temporary, and reversible states are dreaming, psychotic episodes, psychedelic drug experiences, some epileptic seizures, and hypnosis in highly hypnotizable subjects. The representational definition of ASC should be applied in the theoretical and empirical studies of ASCs to unify and clarify the conceptual basis of ASC research.
1 April 2014 in Consciousness and Cognition
15 April 2019 in The Journal of Neuroscience
Affective experiences are central not only to our waking life but also to rapid eye movement (REM) sleep dreams. Despite our increasing understanding of the neural correlates of dreaming, we know little about the neural correlates of dream affect. Frontal alpha asymmetry (FAA) is considered a marker of affective states and traits as well as affect regulation in the waking state. Here, we explored whether FAA during REM sleep and during evening resting wakefulness is related to affective experiences in REM sleep dreams. EEG recordings were obtained from 17 human participants (7 men) who spent 2 nights in the sleep laboratory. Participants were awakened 5 min after the onset of every REM stage after which they provided a dream report and rated their dream affect. Two-minute preawakening EEG segments were analyzed. Additionally, 8 min of evening presleep and morning postsleep EEG were recorded during resting wakefulness. Mean spectral power in the alpha band (8–13 Hz) and corresponding FAA were calculated over the frontal (F4-F3) sites. Results showed that FAA during REM sleep, and during evening resting wakefulness, predicted ratings of dream anger. This suggests that individuals with greater alpha power in the right frontal hemisphere may be less able to regulate (i.e., inhibit) strong affective states, such as anger, in dreams. Additionally, FAA was positively correlated across wakefulness and REM sleep. Together, these findings imply that FAA may serve as a neural correlate of affect regulation not only in the waking but also in the dreaming state. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT We experience emotions not only during wakefulness but also during dreaming. Despite our increasing understanding of the neural correlates of dreaming, we know little about the neural correlates of dream emotions. Here we used electroencephalography to explore how frontal alpha asymmetry (FAA)—the relative difference in alpha power between the right and left frontal cortical areas that is associated with emotional processing and emotion regulation in wakefulness—is related to dream emotions. We show that individuals with greater FAA (i.e., greater right-sided alpha power) during rapid eye movement sleep, and during evening wakefulness, experience more anger in dreams. FAA may thus reflect the ability to regulate emotions not only in the waking but also in the dreaming state.
1 October 2017 in The American Journal of Psychology
This study demonstrates that different methods for measuring emotional experiences in dreams—self-ratings of dreams using emotion rating scales versus external ratings in the form of content analysis of narrative dream reports—can lead to strikingly different results and contradicting conclusions about the emotional content of home dreams. During 3 consecutive weeks, every morning upon awakening, 44 participants (16 men, 28 women, average age 26.9 ± 5.1 years) reported their dreams and rated their emotional experiences in those dreams using the modified Differential Emotions Scale. Two external judges rated emotional experiences in the same 552 (M = 12.55 ± 5.72) home dream reports using the same scale. Comparison of the 2 methods showed that with self-ratings dreams were rated as more emotional and more positive than with external ratings. Moreover, whereas with self-ratings the majority of dreams was rated as positively valenced, with external ratings the majority of dream reports was rated as negatively valenced. Although self- and external ratings converge, at least partially, in the measurement of negative emotional experiences, they diverge greatly in the measurement of positive emotional experiences. On one hand, this discrepancy may result from different biases inherent in the 2 measurement methods highlighting the need to develop better methods for measuring emotional experiences. On the other hand, self- and external ratings may capture different phenomena and should thus be considered complementary and used concurrently. Nevertheless, results suggest that negative emotional experiences can be measured in a more valid and reliable manner than positive emotional experiences. Supplementary results are available at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/ajp/media/sikka/how_you_measure/
13 January 2023 in Journal of Affective Disorders
Alexithymia is a trait characterized by difficulties identifying feelings, difficulties describing feelings, and externally orientated thinking. It is widely regarded as an important transdiagnostic risk factor for a range of psychopathologies, including depressive and anxiety disorders. Whilst several well-validated psychometric measures of alexithymia exist, these are relatively lengthy, thus limiting their utility in time-pressured settings. In this paper, we address this gap by introducing and validating a brief 6-item version of the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire, called the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire-Short Form (PAQ-S). Across two studies with adult samples (Study 1 N = 508 United States community; Study 2 = 378 Australian college students), we examined the psychometric properties of the PAQ-S in terms of its factor structure, reliability, and concurrent/criterion validity. In exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, all PAQ-S items loaded well on a single general alexithymia factor. The PAQ-S total score had high reliability, and correlated as expected with the long-form of the PAQ, as well as other established markers of alexithymia, emotion regulation, and affective disorder symptoms. Our samples were general community or college student samples from two Western countries; future validation work in clinical samples and more diverse cultural groups is thus needed. The PAQ-S retains the psychometric strengths of the PAQ. As such, the PAQ-S can be used as a quick, robust measure of overall alexithymia levels. The introduction of the PAQ-S hence enables valid assessments of alexithymia in a more diverse range of settings and research designs.