Sebastiano Moruzzi

Sebastiano Moruzzi

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Sebastiano Moruzzi

Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 August 2017 in Noûs
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Journal Article
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DRDavid Rose
David Rose
Edouard MacheryEdouard Machery
Edouard Machery
SSStephen Stich
Stephen Stich
MAMario Alai
Mario Alai
AAAdriano Angelucci
Adriano Angelucci
JZJing Zhu
Jing Zhu

23 August 2017 in Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research
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Journal Article
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Edouard MacheryEdouard Machery
Edouard Machery
SSStephen Stich
Stephen Stich
DRDavid Rose
David Rose
MAMario Alai
Mario Alai
AAAdriano Angelucci
Adriano Angelucci
JZJing Zhu
Jing Zhu

25 July 2018 in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
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Journal Article
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FFFilippo Ferrari
Filippo Ferrari
SMSebastiano Moruzzi
Sebastiano Moruzzi
Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism (EAP) is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as it involves a reconfiguration of the dialectic between deflationists and pluralists.

26 October 2017 in Inquiry
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Journal Article
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FFFilippo Ferrari
Filippo Ferrari
SMSebastiano Moruzzi
Sebastiano Moruzzi
According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to reside at the very heart of a logical system, different relations of logical consequence yield different logics. In this paper, we are especially interested in understanding what are the consequences of endorsing Beall and Restall’s version of logical pluralism vis-à-vis the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide to reasoners. In particular, the aim of this paper is threefold. First, in Sections 2 and 3, we offer an exegesis of Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism as a thesis of semantic indeterminacy of our concept of logical consequence – i.e. understood as indeterminacy logical pluralism. Second, in Sections 4 and 5, we elaborate and critically scrutinize three models of semantic indeterminacy that we think are fit to capture Beall and Restall’s indeterminacy logical pluralism. Third, in Section 6, following Beall and Restall’s assumption that the notion of logical consequence has normative significance for deductive reasoning, we raise a series of normative problems for indeterminacy logical pluralism. The overall conclusion that we aim to establish is that Beall and Restall’s indeterminate logical pluralism cannot offer an adequate account of the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide us with in ordinary contexts of reasoning.

4 March 2023 in Social Epistemology
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Journal Article
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FFFilippo Ferrari
Filippo Ferrari
ALAnna Lorusso
Anna Lorusso
SMSebastiano Moruzzi
Sebastiano Moruzzi
GVGiorgio Volpe
Giorgio Volpe
This opening piece of the special issue ‘Perspectives on Post-Truth’ aims to accomplish three tasks. First, and foremost, it highlights the issue’s distinctive feature, namely its variegated approach to post-truth. The leading idea in assembling it has been to draw on different methodologies, theoretical approaches, and competences, in order to gain a fine-grained understanding of the post-truth condition and to develop an effective toolkit to address the most pressing challenges it poses to our societies. The underlying conviction is that a variegated approach is required by the multifaceted nature of the post-truth condition. The curious reader willing to venture through the issue will thus be exposed to different perspectives on post-truth: some pieces address it from a traditional epistemological perspective, others explore post-truth from the perspective of social epistemology, and still others adopt a semiotic perspective. In light of this multiplicity of perspectives, the second task of this piece has been to provide a brief thematic overview of the key issues and perspectives in order to illustrate the overall narrative of the project. The third and final task has been to give a detailed synopsis of each contribution so that the reader will know precisely what to expect from it.

1 January 2019
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Book Chapter
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SMSebastiano Moruzzi
Sebastiano Moruzzi
ACAnnalisa Coliva
Annalisa Coliva
This paper starts from the Equal Validity Paradox, a paradoxical argument connected to the so-called phenomenon of faultless disagreement. It is argued that there are at least six strategies for solving the paradox. After presenting the first five strategies and their main problems, the paper focuses on the sixth strategy which rejects the assumption that every proposition cannot be both true and false. Dialetheism is the natural candidate for developing strategy six. After presenting strategy six in detail, we formulate a normative problem for the dialetheist and offer a tentative solution to it. We then elaborate further considerations connecting strategy six to pluralism about truth and logic. Even if strategy six is a hard path to take, its scrutiny highlights some important points on truth, logic and the norms for acceptance and rejection.