Some participants of the public debate have argued that the world before and after the coronavirus crisis will look fundamentally different. An underlying assumption is that this crisis will alter public opinion in such a way that it leads to profound societal and political change. Scholarship suggests that while some policy preferences are quite volatile and prone to change under the influence of crises, core values formed during childhood are likely to remain stable. In this article, we test stability or change of a well-selected set of opinions and values before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We rely on a unique longitudinal panel study whereby the Dutch fieldwork of the European Values Study 2017 web survey serves as a baseline; respondents were re-approached in May 2020. The findings indicate that values remain largely stable. However, there is an increase in political support, confirming the so-called rally effect. We conclude our manuscript with a response to the futurists expecting changes in public opinion because of the coronavirus crisis.
This study aims to explain variation in the level of tolerance towards homosexuality between European countries. Results of multi-level regression analyses on 40 countries from the 2008 wave of the European Values Study show that countries’ economic affluence and laws on same-sex unions are positively associated with individuals’ tolerance towards homosexuality. An additional exercise suggests that the association between laws and attitudes may be the result of two-way causality; legislation seems to both shape and reflect levels of tolerance towards homosexuality. The study finds no independent association between tolerance and the level of religiosity in a country and refutes the hypothesis that high numbers of diagnosed HIV cases resulting from sex between men are negatively related to tolerance towards homosexuality in Europe.
Typically, grandmothers are actively involved in the lives of their grandchildren, most frequently as care providers. At the same time, these individuals become grandparents while still employed. These two roles—of active grandparent and worker—might conflict, since both demand time and energy. This study examines whether the birth of the first grandchild leads to labour market withdrawal for women, and whether there are differences between grandmothers according to their work history and household economic resources. We considered the work history of women both as a measure of work–family preferences and a source of opportunities and constraints to labour market behaviour later in life. Our analyses of data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) 2002–2017 using hybrid logistic models show that the probability of labour market withdrawal increases after the birth of the first grandchild. Women who had continuous working careers, or short employment interruptions, were more likely to withdraw from the labour market after the birth of the first grandchild than their counterparts with non-continuous careers, as well as women living in wealthy households. The explanation lies in the lower opportunity cost these women encounter in withdrawing from the labour market. Our findings relate to policies aimed at increasing retirement ages all over Europe, advocating that these measures could conflict with grandmothers’ involvement in their grandchildren’s lives.
The authors explore the impact of religion on two key parental values – obedience and autonomy – in contemporary Dutch society, one of the most secularized countries in the world. Three main religious dimensions are investigated: belonging (religious denomination), behaving (church attendance) and believing (traditional beliefs about God). In analysing survey data from the 2008 European Values Study in the Netherlands, it was found that religious dimensions appear to be significant attributes of parental values. Furthermore, denominational differences in both autonomy and obedience can be explained by church attendance (network mechanism), whereas differences in autonomy can partly be explained by transcendental beliefs (moral mechanism). However, the heterogeneity of the religious population in the Netherlands makes conclusions anything but straightforward and sometimes contrary to theoretical expectations.
In this study, we assess whether divorce experiences in three social contexts shape individual’s permissiveness toward divorce. Using European Values Study data from 44 countries, we find that—net of personal divorce experience—parental divorce before the age of 18 (socialization context); parental divorce after the age of 18, divorce of child, and divorce of relatives (context in adult life); and country’s divorce rate (national context) are related to more permissiveness toward divorce. Value climates in these three contexts clearly mediate the relationships between experiences and attitudes, but parental divorce before the age of 18, divorce of child, and divorce of relatives still are independently and positively related to permissiveness toward divorce. These findings suggest that divorce experiences affect pro-divorce attitudes on top of prevailing value climates in social contexts that are relatively close to the individual. Finally, robustness tests show that personal divorce is not only an important determinant of pro-divorce attitudes, the role played by divorce experiences in the three contexts also depends on being divorced or not. Moreover, singles are more strongly affected by their surrounding contexts than people with a stable relationship.
This study contrasts two theoretical perspectives on the relationship between intergenerational class mobility and child-rearing values. According to the dissociative thesis, which describes social mobility as a disruptive experience leading to insecurity, social isolation, stress and frustration, socially mobile individuals less often prefer community-oriented qualities such as tolerance and respect for other people, unselfishness, good manners and obedience. The beneficiary thesis, on the other hand, predicts that socially mobile individuals have a stronger preference for individual-based values such as hard work, determination, responsibility, independence and thrift. In both cases, these mobility effects are thought to be stronger for more extremely mobile individuals and for downwardly mobile compared with upwardly mobile individuals. However, using Dutch data from the European Values Study 2008, hardly any significant intergenerational mobility effects are found. Maybe intergenerational mobility is not such an extraordinary experience as mobility theory would lead us to believe, or mobile individuals adjust themselves very quickly to their new situation.