Javier Muñoz-Calle

Javier Muñoz-Calle

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Javier Muñoz-Calle

Department of Telematics Engineering, School of Engineering University of Seville Seville Spain

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 January 2022 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JDjesus diaz-verdejo
jesus diaz-verdejo
JMJavier Muñoz-Calle
Javier Muñoz-Calle
AAAntonio Estepa Alonso
Antonio Estepa Alonso
RARafael Estepa Alonso
Rafael Estepa Alonso
GMGermán Madinabeitia
Germán Madinabeitia
Signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (SIDS) play a crucial role within the arsenal of security components of most organizations. They can find traces of known attacks in the network traffic or host events for which patterns or signatures have been pre-established. SIDS include standard packages of detection rulesets, but only those rules suited to the operational environment should be activated for optimal performance. However, some organizations might skip this tuning process and instead activate default off-the-shelf rulesets without understanding its implications and trade-offs. In this work, we help gain insight into the consequences of using predefined rulesets in the performance of SIDS. We experimentally explore the performance of three SIDS in the context of web attacks. In particular, we gauge the detection rate obtained with predefined subsets of rules for Snort, ModSecurity and Nemesida using seven attack datasets. We also determine the precision and rate of alert generated by each detector in a real-life case using a large trace from a public webserver. Results show that the maximum detection rate achieved by the SIDS under test is insufficient to protect systems effectively and is lower than expected for known attacks. Our results also indicate that the choice of predefined settings activated on each detector strongly influences its detection capability and false alarm rate. Snort and ModSecurity scored either a very poor detection rate (activating the less-sensitive predefined ruleset) or a very poor precision (activating the full ruleset). We also found that using various SIDS for a cooperative decision can improve the precision or the detection rate, but not both. Consequently, it is necessary to reflect upon the role of these open-source SIDS with default configurations as core elements for protection in the context of web attacks. Finally, we provide an efficient method for systematically determining which rules deactivate from a ruleset to significantly reduce the false alarm rate for a target operational environment. We tested our approach using Snort’s ruleset in our real-life trace, increasing the precision from 0.015 to 1 in less than 16 h of work.

5 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JDjesus diaz-verdejo
jesus diaz-verdejo
RARafael Estepa Alonso
Rafael Estepa Alonso
AAAntonio Estepa Alonso
Antonio Estepa Alonso
JMJavier Munoz-Calle
Javier Munoz-Calle
Intrusion detection systems based on anomalies (A-IDS) are crucial for detecting cyberattacks, especially zero-day attacks. Numerous A-IDS proposals in the literature report excellent performance according to established metrics and settings in a laboratory. However, finding systems implementing these proposals in real-world scenarios is challenging. This work explores, through a case study, the suitability of performance metrics commonly used in the scientific literature to real-world scenarios. Our case study will consider a Web attack detector based on URIs and a real, large-scale dataset. Our results show significant limitations in the performance metrics commonly used to select the system’s operating point and its practical use in real-world scenarios.

14 September 2024 in JUCS - Journal of Universal Computer Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JMJavier Muñoz-Calle
Javier Muñoz-Calle
RARafael Estepa Alonso
Rafael Estepa Alonso
AAAntonio Estepa Alonso
Antonio Estepa Alonso
JDjesus diaz-verdejo
jesus diaz-verdejo
ECElvira Castillo-Fernández
Elvira Castillo-Fernández
GMGermán Madinabeitia
Germán Madinabeitia
Network monitoring systems can struggle to detect the full sequence of actions in a multi-step cyber attack, frequently resulting in multiple alerts (some of which are false positive (FP)) and missed actions. The challenge of easing the job of security analysts by triggering a single and accurate alert per attack requires developing and evaluating advanced event correlation techniques and models that have the potential to devise relationships between the different observed events/alerts. This work introduces a flexible architecture designed for hierarchical and iterative correlation of alerts and events. Its key feature is the sequential correlation of operations targeting specific attack episodes or aspects. This architecture utilizes IDS alerts or similar cybersecurity sensors, storing events and alerts in a non-relational database. Modules designed for knowledge creation then query these stored items to generate meta-alerts, also stored in the database. This approach facilitates creating a more refined knowledge that can be built on top of existing one by creating specialized modules. For illustrative purposes, we make a case study where we use this architectural approach to explore the feasibility of monitoring the progress of attacks of increased complexity by increasing the levels of the hyperalerts defined, including a case of a multi-step attack that adheres to the ATT&CK model. Although the mapping between the observations and the model components (i.e., techniques and tactics) is challenging, we could fully monitor the progress of two attacks and up to 5 out of 6 steps of the most complex attack by building up to three specialized modules. Despite some limitations due to the sensors and attack scenarios tested, the results indicate the architecture’s potential for enhancing the detection of complex cyber attacks, offering a promising direction for future cybersecurity research.

5 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JDjesus diaz-verdejo
jesus diaz-verdejo
RARafael Estepa Alonso
Rafael Estepa Alonso
AAAntonio Estepa Alonso
Antonio Estepa Alonso
JMJavier Munoz-Calle
Javier Munoz-Calle
GMGerman Madinabeitia
German Madinabeitia
The development of anomaly-based intrusion detection systems is hindered by the scarcity of adequate datasets. An ideal dataset should contain real traffic, genuine attacks and cover a large time period that may demonstrate time shift. To be useful, the dataset must be labeled to provide accurate ground-truth, This paper presents a dataset of URLs that possesses these qualities. It can therefore be used to effectively train, test, and validate URL-based anomaly detection systems. The dataset is publicly available and contains 47M registers, including 320k attacks, and spans for 6.5 months. It is partitioned acording to two schemes to allow for time dependent and time independent experiments.

14 June 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ECElvira Castillo-Fernández
Elvira Castillo-Fernández
JDjesus diaz-verdejo
jesus diaz-verdejo
RARafael Estepa Alonso
Rafael Estepa Alonso
AAAntonio Estepa Alonso
Antonio Estepa Alonso
JCJavier Muñoz Calle
Javier Muñoz Calle
GMGermán Mabinabeitia
Germán Mabinabeitia

5 June 2025 in Cybersecurity
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JDjesus diaz-verdejo
jesus diaz-verdejo
RARafael Estepa Alonso
Rafael Estepa Alonso
AEAntonio Estepa
Antonio Estepa
JMJavier Muñoz-Calle
Javier Muñoz-Calle
GMGermán Madinabeitia
Germán Madinabeitia
This paper introduces Biblio-US17, a labeled dataset collected over 6 months from the log files of a popular public website at the University of Seville. It contains 47 million records, each including the method, uniform resource identifier (URI) and associated response code and size of every request received by the web server. Records have been classified as either normal or attack using a comprehensive semi-automated process, which involved signature-based detection, assisted inspection of URIs vocabulary, and substantial expert manual supervision. Unlike comparable datasets, this one offers a genuine real-world perspective on the normal operation of an active website, along with an unbiased proportion of actual attacks (i.e., non-synthetic). This makes it ideal for evaluating and comparing anomaly-based approaches in a realistic environment. Its extensive size and duration also make it valuable for addressing challenges like data shift and insufficient training. This paper describes the collection and labeling processes, dataset structure, and most relevant properties. We also include an example of an application for assessing the performance of a simple anomaly detector. Biblio-US17, now available to the scientific community, can also be used to model the URIs used by current web servers.