Marios Kogias

Marios Kogias

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Marios Kogias

Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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10 September 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RYRui Yang
Rui Yang
MKMarios Kogias
Marios Kogias

22 June 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
HLHugo Lefeuvre
Hugo Lefeuvre
DCDavid Chisnall
David Chisnall
MKMarios Kogias
Marios Kogias
POPierre Olivier
Pierre Olivier
Confidential cloud computing enables cloud tenants to distrust their service provider. Achieving confidential computing solutions that provide concrete security guarantees requires not only strong mechanisms, but also carefully designed software interfaces. In this paper, we make the observation that confidential I/O interfaces, caught in the tug-of-war between performance and security, fail to address both at a time when confronted to interface vulnerabilities and observability by the untrusted host. We discuss the problem of safe I/O interfaces in confidential computing, its implications and challenges, and devise research paths to achieve confidential I/O interfaces that are both safe and fast.

16 October 2023 in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LCLuke Cheeseman
Luke Cheeseman
MPMatthew J. Parkinson
Matthew J. Parkinson
SCSylvan Clebsch
Sylvan Clebsch
MKMarios Kogias
Marios Kogias
SDSophia Drossopoulou
Sophia Drossopoulou
PLPaul Liétar
Paul Liétar
Expressing parallelism and coordination is central for modern concurrent programming. Many mechanisms exist for expressing both parallelism and coordination. However, the design decisions for these two mechanisms are tightly intertwined. We believe that the interdependence of these two mechanisms should be recognised and achieved through a single, powerful primitive. We are not the first to realise this: the prime example is actor model programming, where parallelism arises through fine-grained decomposition of a program’s state into actors that are able to execute independently in parallel. However, actor model programming has a serious pain point: updating multiple actors as a single atomic operation is a challenging task. We address this pain point by introducing a new concurrency paradigm: Behaviour-Oriented Concurrency (BoC). In BoC, we are revisiting the fundamental concept of a behaviour to provide a more transactional concurrency model. BoC enables asynchronously creating atomic and ordered units of work with exclusive access to a collection of independent resources. In this paper, we describe BoC informally in terms of examples, which demonstrate the advantages of exclusive access to several independent resources, as well as the need for ordering. We define it through a formal model. We demonstrate its practicality by implementing a C++ runtime. We argue its applicability through the Savina benchmark suite: benchmarks in this suite can be more compactly represented using BoC in place of Actors, and we observe comparable, if not better, performance.

22 June 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
CCCharly Castes
Charly Castes
AGAdrien Ghosn
Adrien Ghosn
NKNeelu S. Kalani
Neelu S. Kalani
YQYuchen Qian
Yuchen Qian
MKMarios Kogias
Marios Kogias
EBEdouard Bugnion
Edouard Bugnion
Software is going through a trust crisis. Privileged code is no longer trusted and processes insufficiently protect user code from unverified libraries. While usually treated separately, confidential computing and program compartmentalization are both symptoms of the same problem, deeply rooted in hierarchical commodity systems: privileged software's monopoly over isolation. This paper proposes a separation of powers: to decouple trust and isolation from privilege hierarchies. It introduces an isolation monitor, which delivers verifiable isolation, confidentiality, and integrity to all software, independent of existing system abstractions and privilege hierarchies. Tyche, our prototype isolation monitor, runs on commodity hardware without relying on complex and emerging hardware security extensions. It enables any software component to create, compose, and nest isolation abstractions, including user and kernel sandboxes, enclaves, as well as confidential virtual machines.

22 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SSSandra Siby
Sandra Siby
SASina Abdollahi
Sina Abdollahi
MMMohammad Maheri
Mohammad Maheri
MKMarios Kogias
Marios Kogias
HHHamed Haddadi
Hamed Haddadi
Machine-learning (ML) models are increasingly being deployed on edge devices to provide a variety of services. However, their deployment is accompanied by challenges in model privacy and auditability. Model providers want to ensure that (i) their proprietary models are not exposed to third parties; and (ii) be able to get attestations that their genuine models are operating on edge devices in accordance with the service agreement with the user. Existing measures to address these challenges have been hindered by issues such as high overheads and limited capability (processing/secure memory) on edge devices. In this work, we propose GuaranTEE, a framework to provide attestable private machine learning on the edge. GuaranTEE uses Confidential Computing Architecture (CCA), Arm's latest architectural extension that allows for the creation and deployment of dynamic Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) within which models can be executed. We evaluate CCA's feasibility to deploy ML models by developing, evaluating, and openly releasing a prototype. We also suggest improvements to CCA to facilitate its use in protecting the entire ML deployment pipeline on edge devices.