Hemant K. Bhargava

Hemant K. Bhargava

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Hemant K. Bhargava

Graduate School of Management, University of California, Davis, California 95616; and Center for Analytics and Technology in Society, University of California, Davis, California 95616

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2022 in Management Science
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HBHemant K. Bhargava
Hemant K. Bhargava
Many digital platforms give users a bundle of goods sourced from numerous creators, generate revenue through consumption of these goods, and motivate creators by sharing of revenue. This paper studies the platform’s design choices and creators’ participation and supply decisions when users’ (viewers’) consumption of goods (content) is financed by third-party advertisers. The model specifies the platform’s scale: number of creators and content supplied and magnitudes of viewers, advertisers, and revenues. I examine how the distribution of creator capabilities affects market concentration among creators and how it can be influenced by platform design. Tools for ad management and analytics are more impactful when the platform has sufficient content and viewers but has low ad demand. Conversely, reducing viewers’ distaste for ads through better matching and timing—which can create win–win–win effects throughout the ecosystem—is important when the platform has strong demand from advertisers. Platform infrastructure improvements that motivate creators to supply more content (e.g., development toolkits) must be chosen carefully to avoid creating higher concentration among a few powerful creators. Investments in first-party content are most consequential when the platform scale is small and when it has greater urgency to attract more viewers. I show that revenue sharing is (only partly) a tug of war between the platform and creators because a moderate sharing formula strengthens the overall ecosystem and profits of all participants. However, revenue-sharing tensions indicate a need to extend the one-rate-for-all creators approach with richer revenue-sharing arrangements that can better accommodate heterogeneity among creators. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems.

1 November 2013 in Production and Operations Management
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HBHemant K. Bhargava
Hemant K. Bhargava
BKByung Cho Kim
Byung Cho Kim
DSDaewon Sun
Daewon Sun

1 November 2022 in Management Science
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Journal Article
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HBHemant K. Bhargava
Hemant K. Bhargava
KWKitty Wang
Kitty Wang
XZXingyue (Luna) Zhang
Xingyue (Luna) Zhang
Many digital platforms have accrued enormous power and scale, leveraging cross-side network effects between the sides they connect (e.g., producers and consumers or creators and viewers). Platforms motivate a diverse spectrum of producers, large and small, to participate by sharing platform revenue with them, predominantly under a linear revenue-sharing scheme with the same commission rate regardless of producer power or size. Under pressure from society, lawsuits, and antitrust investigations, major platforms have announced revenue sharing designs that favor smaller businesses. We develop a model of platform economics and show that a small-business oriented (SBO) differential revenue sharing design can increase total welfare and outputs on the platform. Although smaller producers almost always benefit from the shift in revenue sharing design, spillover effects can also make large producers better off under some conditions. More interestingly, we show that platforms are the most likely winner under a differential revenue sharing scheme. Hence, an intervention that ostensibly offers concessions and generous treatment to producers might well be self-serving for platforms and good for the entire ecosystem. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: H. K. Bhargava’s work on platform ecosystems was supported by a research excellence gift from Google Apigee in 2018. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4545 .

1 April 2021 in Management Science
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HBHemant K. Bhargava
Hemant K. Bhargava
Many markets feature an economic structure in which value is cocreated by multiple producers and aggregated into a common bundle by a producer-consortium or independent firm. Examples include in-home video entertainment, technology goods and services, multisourced data platforms, and patent pools. This paper develops an economic model to study demand, production choices, revenue sharing, and relative market power in such markets. Producers in these markets are not rivalrous competitors in the usual zero-sum sense, because output of each casts an externality on production decisions of others and total market demand expands with total output, albeit with diminishing returns. This property allows multiple producers to flourish in equilibrium (versus just one with the most favorable technological or cost structure), and more so when the market expands less quickly with total output. Equilibrium production quantities of competitors are strategic complements, yet competition between producers does manifest itself, for example, if one acquires better production technology (i.e., makes value units at lower cost) then the equilibrium production levels of other producers are reduced. Insights are also derived for alternative market structures, for example, producers have more output and earn higher profit when organized into a distribution consortium (e.g., Hulu or consortia of zoos or museums) versus relying on a separate retailer. Mergers between producers have similar effect. The formulation enables us to rigorously answer economic questions ranging from pricing, revenue sharing, and production levels in a static setting, to market dynamics covering both the causes and effects of changes in industry structure. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.

30 October 2004 in Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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HBHemant K. Bhargava
Hemant K. Bhargava
JFJuan Feng
Juan Feng

11 June 2014 in Information Technology and Management
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HBHemant K. Bhargava
Hemant K. Bhargava