Samir Ghannam

Samir Ghannam

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Samir Ghannam

Accounting Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology Sydney Sydney New South Wales Australia

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2018 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SGSamir Ghannam
Samir Ghannam
MBMartin Bugeja
Martin Bugeja
ZMZoltan P. Matolcsy
Zoltan P. Matolcsy
HSHelen Spiropoulos
Helen Spiropoulos
We investigate whether qualified and experienced directors are willing to join firms following the revelation of financial fraud. Specifically, we focus on directors with prior board experience and accounting and legal experts. We find that, notwithstanding the tarnished reputation of fraudulent firms and a higher workload, qualified and experienced directors join the boards of such firms. Subsequent to joining fraudulent firms, directors are rewarded with additional future board seats and benefit from higher compensation. We rule out alternative explanations and verify the robustness of the results by performing a variety of tests, including propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analysis. JEL Classifications: G30; G34.

28 September 2023 in Contemporary Accounting Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ABAnna Bedford
Anna Bedford
SGSamir Ghannam
Samir Ghannam
MGMatthew Grosse
Matthew Grosse
NMNelson Ma
Nelson Ma
We examine the role of CEO power in the appointment of accounting financial experts (AFEs) to firm audit committees. Our results show that firms with powerful CEOs have a lower likelihood of appointing AFEs to their audit committees. In addition, effective AFEs—those characterized by experience, high status, and social independence from the CEO—are less likely to be appointed in firms with powerful CEOs. In the presence of powerful CEOs, effective AFEs are also less likely to be designated audit committee chair. The absence of effective AFEs is associated with the use of accounting discretion by powerful CEOs to meet or just beat analyst earnings forecasts. We find no evidence that AFEs choose to avoid serving on the boards of firms with powerful CEOs. Our findings are consistent with powerful CEOs influencing board appointments post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley Act through informal channels, including through their social ties with nominating committees. Our results suggest that current regulations prohibiting CEO involvement in the director nomination process and specifying who qualifies as a financial expert may be insufficient to ensure audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality.

1 April 2019 in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SGSamir Ghannam
Samir Ghannam
ZMZoltan P. Matolcsy
Zoltan P. Matolcsy
HSHelen Spiropoulos
Helen Spiropoulos
NTNathan Thai
Nathan Thai

1 March 2021 in International Journal of Auditing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ABAnna Bedford
Anna Bedford
MBMartin Bugeja
Martin Bugeja
SGSamir Ghannam
Samir Ghannam
NMNelson Ma
Nelson Ma

15 March 2020 in Accounting & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
VCVictoria Clout
Victoria Clout
SGSamir Ghannam
Samir Ghannam
ALAnna Loyeung
Anna Loyeung
JYJin Sug Yang
Jin Sug Yang

1 January 2012 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
MBMartin Bugeja
Martin Bugeja
SGSamir Ghannam
Samir Ghannam
ZMZoltan Matolcsy
Zoltan Matolcsy
HSHelen Spiropoulos
Helen Spiropoulos
Responding to the social recognition of the importance of corporate gender-diversity, the topic has evoked significant interest in academic literature. This pap