Tom O'Grady

Tom O'Grady

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Tom O'Grady

University College London

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 January 2021 in British Journal of Political Science
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PLPeter Egge Langsæther
Peter Egge Langsæther
GEGeoffrey Evans
Geoffrey Evans
TOTom O'Grady
Tom O'Grady
Past findings on the connection between class position and political preferences are overwhelmingly derived from cross-sectional studies, which provided a limited basis for inferring causality. This study uses long-term panel data on thousands of British respondents to measure the impact of intra-generational class mobility across a range of political identities and preferences. Upward class mobility leads to small increases in economic conservatism, but party choice, class identity and attitudes to non-economic issues do not change. This updating of economic values is much smaller than cross-sectional differences between classes. These results are consistent with the short-run effects of class mobility operating primarily through a limited economic self-interest mechanism. Beliefs that are plausibly unconnected to economics are unaffected. The overall association between class and a range of identities, opinions and preferences is therefore more likely to be caused by early life experiences and longer-term socialization than by the immediate material interests associated with jobs.

1 October 2019 in Research & Politics
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TOTom O’gRady
Tom O’gRady
TATarik Abou-Chadi
Tarik Abou-Chadi
Many studies have found that European parties change their policy positions in response to changes in public opinion. This is both theoretically and normatively appealing, suggesting that European party politics operates in a way that is consistent with spatial models. Nonetheless, virtually all previous studies are based on a single, uni-dimensional measure of public opinion: left–right self-placement from the Eurobarometer surveys. This measure has a number of flaws, including the fact that political conflict in Europe now occurs across multiple issue dimensions beyond the classic divide on state involvement in the economy. We used new measures of Europeans’ ideological positions across four different issue dimensions and 26 countries from 1981–2016, together with data on parties’ policy positions from their manifestos, to re-evaluate findings on responsiveness. Across many different model specifications, samples and outcome measures, we found virtually no evidence that European political parties respond to public opinion on any issue dimension. Our findings suggest that scholars may require better measures of party positions, more nuanced theories of responsiveness (for example to sub-groups, or across longer time horizons), or may need to refocus their attention towards responsiveness via policy outcomes rather than parties’ policy commitments.

21 October 2026 in Journal of Public Policy
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TOTom O’GRady
Tom O’GRady
Punitive policies such as migrant detention and benefits sanctions are growing in popularity. Politicians claim that the threat of harsher punishment deters undesired behavior, yet much evidence suggests that this is incorrect. Why, then, is it popular with voters? Building on literature from crime and punishment, I use vignette experiments in the UK to test whether this is because they believe that punishment acts as a deterrent, or because they view it as retribution for immoral behavior. Respondents rated the likelihood of desired behavior from hypothetical migrants and benefits claimants, and from themselves, in response to punishments of varying severity. They believed that some punishment had a deterrent effect but harsher penalties had little further payoff. Punishment was supported because migrants and benefits claimants fail to live up to people’s behavioral standards, particularly amongst authoritarians. Thus punitive measures enact retribution against outgroups, reinforcing moral boundaries and a rule-bound, orderly society.