Claudio Panico

Claudio Panico

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Claudio Panico

Department of Management and Technology, and ICRIOS Bocconi University Milan Italy

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 March 2020 in Strategic Management Journal
Verified
Journal Article
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CPClaudio Panico
Claudio Panico
CCCarmelo Cennamo
Carmelo Cennamo

8 October 2013 in Strategic Management Journal
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Journal Article
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AGAlfonso Gambardella
Alfonso Gambardella
CPClaudio Panico
Claudio Panico
GVGiovanni Valentini
Giovanni Valentini

1 June 2014 in Research Policy
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Journal Article
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AGAlfonso Gambardella
Alfonso Gambardella
CPClaudio Panico
Claudio Panico

19 December 2016 in Strategic Management Journal
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Journal Article
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CPClaudio Panico
Claudio Panico

1 January 2020 in Organization Science
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Journal Article
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AGAlfonso Gambardella
Alfonso Gambardella
PKPooyan Khashabi
Pooyan Khashabi
CPClaudio Panico
Claudio Panico
Management practices explain an important part of the heterogeneity in firm productivity, but the literature has largely focused on manufacturing, while leaving out research in the industrial setting. A key managerial practice in industrial research projects is the use of autonomy (through the delegation of decision rights). Our paper clarifies the drivers and the effects of autonomy in settings where other managerial instruments are less effective. We discuss that in industrial research projects, autonomy is set for efficiency reasons—autonomy allows researchers to make more competent decisions about a specific problem—as well as for motivational considerations—autonomy motivates researchers to exert greater effort. We also argue that project-relevant capital—the resources that enhance the productivity of researchers on a given project—is a key driver of autonomy. We theorize that the efficiency and motivational channels have opposite implications for the relationship between project-relevant capital and autonomy and find that, empirically, this relationship is U-shaped, which is suggestive evidence of the presence of both channels.

28 July 2009 in Industrial and Corporate Change
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Journal Article
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AGAlfonso Gambardella
Alfonso Gambardella
MGMarco S. Giarratana
Marco S. Giarratana
CPClaudio Panico
Claudio Panico
The increasing competition in the labor market for human capital pushes firms to create better incentives to manage talented individuals. In this article, we model the optimal employment contract when two features of human capital are present: (i) private information of the employee about his skills; and (ii) the inability to contract on the output of the employment activity. Our model shows how firms can use delegation (i.e., the employee's job autonomy) to provide the incentives to a privately informed employee. The model novelty resides in turning a classic source of potential inefficiency like asymmetric information into a factor that firms can use to design incentives. Our model provides a new explanation of why, in technologically dynamic environments, one observes more intense formations of start-ups and a greater inter-firm mobility of human capital. Our setting also suggests how established companies can use their complementary assets to provide better incentives to their skilled employees.