Stephanie Forrest

Stephanie Forrest

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Stephanie Forrest

Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

34Years (1993-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 1998 in Journal of Computer Security
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Journal Article
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SHSteven A. Hofmeyr
Steven A. Hofmeyr
SFStephanie Forrest
Stephanie Forrest
ASAnil Somayaji
Anil Somayaji
A method is introduced for detecting intrusions at the level of privileged processes. Evidence is given that short sequences of system calls executed by running processes are a good discriminator between normal and abnormal operating characteristics of several common UNIX programs. Normal behavior is collected in two ways: Synthetically, by exercising as many normal modes of usage of a program as possible, and in a live user environment by tracing the actual execution of the program. In the former case several types of intrusive behavior were studied; in the latter case, results were analyzed for false positives.

23 April 2004 in Science
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Journal Article
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JBJustin Balthrop
Justin Balthrop
SFStephanie Forrest
Stephanie Forrest
MNM. E. J. Newman
M. E. J. Newman
MWMatthew M. Williamson
Matthew M. Williamson
Malicious computer software in the form of viruses and worms continues to plague modern information networks. What strategies are on the horizon for controlling the digital pestilence? In their Perspective, Balthrop et al. survey the structure of computer networks and analyze their epidemiological characteristics. The most effective strategy may turn out to be a form of speed limit in which the rate of new network connections is controlled. A throttling mechanism of this sort would slow the spread of computer infections while leaving normal network traffic unhampered.

7 June 2013 in Software Quality Journal
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Journal Article
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CGClaire Le Goues
Claire Le Goues
SFStephanie Forrest
Stephanie Forrest
WWWestley Weimer
Westley Weimer

18 January 2021 in Nature Machine Intelligence
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Journal Article
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RMRisto Miikkulainen
Risto Miikkulainen
SFStephanie Forrest
Stephanie Forrest

1 November 2006
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Conference Paper
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JKJosh Karlin
Josh Karlin
SFStephanie Forrest
Stephanie Forrest
JRJennifer Rexford
Jennifer Rexford
The Internet's interdomain routing protocol, BGP, is vulnerable to a number of damaging attacks, which often arise from operator misconfiguration. Proposed solutions with strong guarantees require a public-key infrastructure, accurate routing registries, and changes to BGP. However, BGP routers can avoid selecting and propagating these routes if they are cautious about adopting new reachability information. We describe a protocol- preserving enhancement to BGP, Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP), that slows the dissemination of bogus routes, providing network operators time to respond before problems escalate into large- scale Internet attacks. Simulation results show that realistic deployments of PGBGP could provide 99% of Autonomous Systems with 24 hours to investigate and repair bogus routes without affecting prefix reachability. We also show that without PGBGP, 40% of ASs cannot avoid selecting bogus routes; with PGBGP, this number drops to less than 1%. Finally, we show that PGBGP is incrementally deployable and offers significant security benefits to early adopters and their customers.

12 March 2007 in Immunological Reviews
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Journal Article
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SFStephanie Forrest
Stephanie Forrest
CBCatherine Beauchemin
Catherine Beauchemin