Antonio Maldonado

Antonio Maldonado

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Antonio Maldonado

Learning, Emotion and Decision Group, Mind, Brain, and Behavior Research Center, University of Granada, Granada, Spain

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

39Years (1988-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 August 2011 in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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YOYasmina Okan
Yasmina Okan
RGRocio Garcia‐Retamero
Rocio Garcia‐Retamero
ECEdward T. Cokely
Edward T. Cokely
AMAntonio Maldonado
Antonio Maldonado

1 September 2009 in Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Leandro Luigi Di StasiLeandro Luigi Di Stasi
Leandro Luigi Di Stasi
VÁVanessa Álvarez-Valbuena
Vanessa Álvarez-Valbuena
JCJosé J. Cañas
José J. Cañas
AMAntonio Maldonado
Antonio Maldonado
ACAndres Catena
Andres Catena
ACAntonio Candido
Antonio Candido

1 January 2013 in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ATAna Torres
Ana Torres
ACAndres Catena
Andres Catena
AMAlberto Megías-Robles
Alberto Megías-Robles
AMAntonio Maldonado
Antonio Maldonado
ACAntonio Cándido
Antonio Cándido
JPJosé C. Perales
José C. Perales
Impulsivity is tightly linked to addiction. However, there are several pathways by means of which impulsive individuals are more prone to become addicts, or to suffer an addiction more intensely and for a longer period. One of those pathways involves an inadequate appraisal or regulation of positive and negative emotions, leading to lack of control over hazardous behaviors, and inappropriate decisions. In the present work, we assessed cocaine-dependent individuals (CDI; n = 20), pathological gamblers (PG; n = 21), and healthy controls (HC; n = 23) in trait impulsivity measures (UPPS-P model's dimensions), and decision-making tasks (Go/No-go; delay-discounting task). During the Go/No-go task, electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was recorded, and Go/No-go stimuli-evoked potentials (ERP) were extracted. Theory-driven ERP analyses focused on the No-go > Go difference in the N2 ERP. Our results show that negative urgency is one of the several psychological features that distinguish addicts from HC. Nevertheless, among the dimensions of trait impulsivity, negative urgency is unique at independently covarying with gambling over-pathologization in the PG sample. Cocaine-dependent individuals performed more poorly than gamblers in the Go/No-go task, and showed abnormal Go/No-go stimuli-evoked potentials. The difference between the No-go stimulus-evoked N2, and the Go one was attenuated by severity and intensity of chronic cocaine use. Emotional dimensions of impulsivity, however, did not influence Go/No-go performance.

2 July 2012 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ACAndres Catena
Andres Catena
JPJosé C. Perales
José C. Perales
AMAlberto Megías-Robles
Alberto Megías-Robles
ACAntonio Cándido
Antonio Cándido
EJElvia Jara
Elvia Jara
AMAntonio Maldonado
Antonio Maldonado
The Stimulus Preceding Negativity (SPN) is a non-motor slow cortical potential elicited by temporally predictable stimuli, customarily interpreted as a physiological index of expectancy. Its origin would be the brain activity responsible for generating the anticipatory mental representation of an expected upcoming event. The SPN manifests itself as a slow cortical potential with negative slope, growing in amplitude as the stimulus approximates. The uncertainty hypothesis we present here postulates that the SPN is linked to control-related areas in the prefrontal cortex that become more active before the occurrence of an upcoming outcome perceived as uncertain. We tested the uncertainty hypothesis by using a repeated measures design in a Human Contingency Learning task with two levels of uncertainty. In the high uncertainty condition, the outcome is unpredictable. In the mid uncertainty condition, the outcome can be learnt to be predicted in 75% of the trials. Our experiment shows that the Stimulus Preceding Negativity is larger for probabilistically unpredictable (uncertain) outcomes than for probabilistically predictable ones. sLoreta estimations of the brain activity preceding the outcome suggest that prefrontal and parietal areas can be involved in its generation. Prefrontal sites activation (Anterior Cingulate and Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex) seems to be related to the degree of uncertainty. Activation in posterior parietal areas, however, does not correlates with uncertainty. We suggest that the Stimulus Preceding Negativity reflects the attempt to predict the outcome, when posterior brain areas fail to generate a stable expectancy. Uncertainty is thus conceptualized, not just as the absence of learned expectancy, but as a state with psychological and physiological entity.

1 June 2016 in Journal of Behavioral Addictions
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JNJuan F. Navas
Juan F. Navas
AVAntonio Verdejo-Garcia
Antonio Verdejo-Garcia
MLMarta López-Gómez
Marta López-Gómez
AMAntonio Maldonado
Antonio Maldonado
JPJosé C. Perales
José C. Perales
Background and aims: Existing research shows that gambling disorder patients (GDPs) process gambling outcomes abnormally when compared against healthy controls (HCs). These anomalies present the form of exaggerated or distorted beliefs regarding the expected utility of outcomes and one’s ability to predict or control gains and losses, as well as retrospective reinterpretations of what caused them. This study explores the possibility that the emotional regulation strategies GDPs use to cope with aversive events are linked to these cognitions. Methods: 41 GDPs and 45 HCs, matched in sociodemographic variables, were assessed in gambling severity, emotion-regulation strategies (cognitive emotion-regulation questionnaire, CERQ), and gambling-related cognitions (gambling-related cognitions scale, GRCS). Results: GDPs showed higher scores in all gambling-related cognition dimensions. Regarding emotion regulation, GDPs were observed to use self-blame and catastrophizing, but also positive refocusing, more often than controls. Additionally, in GDPs, putatively adaptive CERQ strategies shared a significant portion of variance with South Oaks gambling screen severity and GRCS beliefs. Shared variability was mostly attributable to the roles of refocusing on planning and putting into perspective at positively predicting severity and the interpretative bias (GDPs propensity to reframe losses in a more benign way), respectively. Discussion and conclusions: Results show links between emotion-regulation strategies and problematic gambling-related behaviors and cognitions. The pattern of those links supports the idea that GDPs use emotion-regulation strategies, customarily regarded as adaptive, to cope with negative emotions, so that the motivational and cognitive processing of gambling outcomes becomes less effective in shaping gambling-related behavior.

1 December 2011 in Safety Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AMAlberto Megías-Robles
Alberto Megías-Robles
AMAntonio Maldonado
Antonio Maldonado
ACAndres Catena
Andres Catena
Leandro Luigi Di StasiLeandro Luigi Di Stasi
Leandro Luigi Di Stasi
JSJesús Serrano
Jesús Serrano
ACAntonio Cándido
Antonio Cándido