Flavio Delbono

Flavio Delbono

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Flavio Delbono

University of Bologna

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

35Years (1992-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 November 2013 in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FDFlavio Delbono
Flavio Delbono
CRCarlo Reggiani
Carlo Reggiani

14 October 2021 in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
GCGuido Caselli
Guido Caselli
MCMichele Costa
Michele Costa
FDFlavio Delbono
Flavio Delbono

7 May 2015 in Economic Theory Bulletin
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
FDFlavio Delbono
Flavio Delbono
LLLuca Lambertini
Luca Lambertini

27 June 2022 in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MCMichele Costa
Michele Costa
FDFlavio Delbono
Flavio Delbono
FLFrancesco Linguiti
Francesco Linguiti

7 December 2015 in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FDFlavio Delbono
Flavio Delbono
LLLuca Lambertini
Luca Lambertini
Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. This happens because the threat of nationalization eliminates the prisoners’ dilemma usually associated with a Cournot game among profit-seekers. We characterise the properties of such a threat and prove that it may allow the policy maker to credibly deter collusion.

28 March 2022 in Journal of Industrial and Business Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FDFlavio Delbono
Flavio Delbono
LLLuca Lambertini
Luca Lambertini
We participate in the lasting debate about the persistence of monopolies under technological change, by examining two deterministic games modelling innovation auctions. We highlight some novel aspects within such debate. If product innovation is at stake, the joint effect of diseconomies of scope and product differentiation may allow the entrant to acquire the innovation and give rise to a duopoly. Process innovation is analysed in a model with increasing marginal production costs to show that the innovating monopolist always uses both technologies by virtue of Jensen’s inequality, and this is sufficient but not necessary to preserve its monopoly power.