16 August 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
With the rapid development of mobile apps, developers tend to implement a variety of functionalities to support users' demands. Thus, they involve the usage of native libraries to fulfill the luxuriant functionalities and maintain fast system responses, instead of using a unitary programming language (i.e., Java). Nonetheless, such an inter-language programming framework also introduces more security issues because attackers can conceal malicious behaviors at the native level to evade Android security vetting. Existing state-of-the-art detection tools mainly rely on the information extracted in the Java code to infer the potential malicious behaviors implemented in native code. None of them could simultaneously study the correlated behaviors in Java and native code. Therefore, in this paper, we proposed a static semantic-driven malware detection tool, GNNDroid , to distinguish malware by combining the behaviors implemented in both Java and native code. First, GNNDroid separately analyzes Java and native code to construct Java function call graphs and native function call graphs. It then utilizes a regex-based function recognition approach to explore the correlations between Java code and native code. According to the code correlations, GNNDroid constructs Multi-Relational Directed Graphs (MRDGs) to extract the comprehensive behaviors. Finally, it executes a Gated Graph Neural Network (GGNN) to analyze the MRDGs and distinguish malicious apps. We assessed GNNDroid by analyzing 40,000 Android apps and compared them with state-of-the-art tools. The result demonstrated that GNNDroid not only performs well when analyzing Java+native apps (i.e., apps implemented by both Java and native code), achieving an F1 of 98.57% but also effectively exploits Java only apps (i.e., apps implemented by Java code), achieving an F1 of 96.31%.
1 June 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
15 July 2025 in Computers & Security
18 August 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) pose significant security risks to the community. Researchers thereby propose techniques to capture the complex and stealthy scenarios of APT attacks through the use of provenance graphs to model system entities and their dependencies. Particularly, to mitigate the dependency explosion problem in attack investigation using provenance graphs, tag-based and priority-based provenance graphs are frequently utilized for analyzing attacks. These methods use threat tag propagation and threat prioritization to reduce the size of the provenance graph for faster analysis. Unfortunately, these methods can allow more complex and potential attacks to evade detection. To overcome these difficulties, we propose an APT attack investigation system, ProTaging, for APT detection and forensic analysis. By using Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) rules to assign and update the node's threat tag, splittable tag propagation to control the scope of threat information, and threat weight aggregation and prioritized backward analysis during the forensic analysis phase, ProTaging effectively reconstructs attack paths in seconds without dependency explosion. Experimental results on both the simulation dataset, DARPA TC E3, E5 dataset, and DARPA OpTC dataset demonstrate that ProTaging generates smaller dependency graphs (2.5 times smaller) and has fewer false positives (6.7 times fewer) compared to state-of-the-art solutions. Additionally, ProTaging significantly reduces manual investigation effort by approximately 99.9%.