Andrew Acito

Andrew Acito

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Andrew Acito

Michigan State University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2017 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AAAndrew A. Acito
Andrew A. Acito
CHChris E. Hogan
Chris E. Hogan
RMRichard D. Mergenthaler
Richard D. Mergenthaler
We investigate whether PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies lead to higher audit fees or turnover likelihood for clients of Big 4 auditors. To examine this, we identify areas of GAAP related to PCAOB deficiencies for each auditor. We then use textual analysis to identify how important the deficiencies are to clients to measure each client's exposure to deficient auditing. We find that this measure positively relates to audit fees and that this association is moderated by client bargaining power. Auditor turnover is also higher when deficiency exposure is high relative to what it would be for peer auditors, but we only observe this relation for smaller clients and do not find it is affected by client bargaining power. Finally, we find that companies switching Big 4 auditors tend to select an auditor resulting in lower deficiency exposure. These results have implications for understanding how PCAOB inspection reports affect the market for audit services. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: We obtain all data from publicly available sources.

30 September 2021 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
AAAndrew A. Acito
Andrew A. Acito
MNMichelle L. Nessa
Michelle L. Nessa
We provide large sample evidence of law firms facilitating U.S. publicly traded companies' tax planning, investigate when evidence of law firm involvement is strongest, and examine some tax planning mechanisms law firms facilitate. Because companies' tax planning relationships with law firms are not publicly observable, we use litigation filings and SEC comment letters to identify companies' observable law firm relationships. We find a positive association between companies' tax planning and the average tax planning of other companies that have a relationship with the same law firm. This association is stronger for companies that are smaller, younger, R&D-intensive, financially constrained, and facing less capital market pressure, but does not vary with auditor-provided tax services. We also find evidence consistent with law firms facilitating the use of tax havens, Double Irish structures, and special purpose entities. Our findings deepen our understanding of companies' tax planning ecosystems.

20 March 2026 in Review of Accounting Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AAAndrew A. Acito
Andrew A. Acito
JPJeffrey A. Pittman
Jeffrey A. Pittman
JTJ. Mike Truelson
J. Mike Truelson
We examine the impact of auditors’ reputation impairments on their private-client market share to explore how conducting low-quality audits affects auditors’ broader client portfolios. Prior evidence implies that an audit office loses public-client market share after a client announces a restatement. However, auditors’ private clients may be less concerned about auditor reputation and quality, given that they have lower agency costs and their financial statement users are often creditors that can rely on direct monitoring to narrow information asymmetry. Also, differences between public and private company audits cast doubt on whether public-client restatements are relevant to private clients. We find that the private-client market share of a Big Four audit office falls by, on average, 5 percent the year after a public client announces a restatement. This evidence suggests that Big Four offices cannot simply replace lost public-client revenue with private-client revenue after suffering reputation damage.

1 August 2015 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
AAAndrew Acito
Andrew Acito
DFDavid Folsom
David Folsom
RZRong Zhao
Rong Zhao
Managers deciding whether to issue sales forecasts face a different cost-benefit trade-off than when deciding to issue the more commonly studied earnings forecasts because sales forecasts provide investors and competitors with a more transparent signal of a firm’s short-term demand information and the actions it will take in the product market. We provide evidence demonstrating that sales forecasts contain information about future sales that is incremental to earnings forecasts. We then investigate whether a firm’s market power relative to competitors within its product market affects managers’ decisions to issue sales forecasts and what effect market power has on the accuracy of these forecasts. We proxy for market power using market share and excess price-cost margin, two measures that directly relate to the sales forecasts we study. Controlling for industry-level effects, we find evidence that higher firm market power, as measured by excess margin, is associated with a higher likelihood of issuing sales forecasts. Higher excess margin is also associated with better forecast accuracy on average. Overall, our findings are consistent with higher-market-power firms being more willing to provide sales forecast information to investors through public disclosures.

29 November 2018
Verified
Thesis
Open access
PDF file
AAAndrew Alexei Acito
Andrew Alexei Acito
This study adds to the earnings guidance debate by investigating whether quarterly guidance is related to two forms of earnings management: (1) benchmark beating and (2) accounting irregularities. Using a post-Regulation Fair Disclosure sample, I find that firms regularly issuing earnings guidance display a discontinuity around zero in their distribution of management forecast errors and a larger discontinuity in their distribution of analyst forecast errors compared to non-guiding firms. Multivariate tests reveal that guiding firms recognize large abnormal accruals to beat their own guidance, but not to beat analyst forecasts, whereas non-guiding firms do recognize large abnormal accruals to beat analyst forecasts. Overall, guiding firms and non-guiding firms use similar levels of abnormal accruals to beat benchmarks. I also find no statistical relation between quarterly guidance and the likelihood of accounting irregularities. In sum, the evidence shows that while guiding firms and non-guiding firms manage earnings to different benchmarks, they are similar in terms of their aggregate earnings management.

10 August 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
AAAndrew Acito
Andrew Acito
GDGabe DiYorio
Gabe DiYorio
JTJonathan Truelson
Jonathan Truelson
Prior research finds that PCAOB inspection reports and enforcement releases affect audit firms' relationships with public companies. It is unclear, however, whether these PCAOB oversight disclosures affect audit firms' relationships with nonpublic clients. Nonpublic clients may avoid audit firms with PCAOB-identified audit issues if these clients value audit quality. Alternatively, nonpublic clients may view public-client audit deficiencies as irrelevant to their audits due to auditing standard and process differences between public and nonpublic audits. Using nonpublic Form 5500 audit and single audit market shares as evidence of auditors' relationships with nonpublic clients, we find that auditors tend to lose nonpublic-client market share when the PCAOB reports Part I deficiencies related to specific audits, releases Part II deficiencies related to auditors' quality control, or issues enforcement actions against auditors. Conversely, there is some evidence that auditors gain nonpublic-client market share when the PCAOB issues clean inspection reports. The effects appear to coincide with when nonpublic clients are likely to learn about PCAOB inspection findings and are concentrated among audit issues relevant to both publicclient and nonpublic-client audits. Overall, our results provide evidence that PCAOB disclosures from its oversight of the public-client audit market have spillover effects on the nonpublic-client audit market.