30 April 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
The high cost of integrated circuit chip production has driven more and more chip design companies to use overseas production services. Since the integrated circuit production cannot be closely monitored, the security of integrated circuit chips has become a major concern. Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion is one type of the hardware attack. HTs are extremely stealthy due to their small sizes and low triggering rates. HTs inserted during manufacturing can have minimum impact on the timing and power. In fact, this impact can be smaller than the timing and power variations caused by the process variations. Therefore, these HTs cannot be easily detected using traditional electrical methods. In this article, we propose a novel optical method, where we image the integrated circuit chip from the backside. Our method, can easily detect any replacements, modifications, or rearrangements of fill cells or functional cells for HT insertion. We use a noise-based detection method to achieve high HT detection rates in different testbenches. To further improve the robustness of our method, we strategically place high reflectance fill cells in the designs. Our approach provides high-resolution, nondestructive, and rapid means to detect HTs inserted during fabrication. We evaluate our approach using various hardware blocks where the HTs can occupy less than 0.1% of the total area or consist of fewer than three gates. In addition, we analyze our method with various magnitudes of noise, process variations, detection window sizes, and resolutions.
10 April 2020 in IEEE Access
The integrated circuit (IC) chips are essential components in a variety of computing systems ranging from consumer electronics to high-security military devices. Hence, the authenticity of ICs is crucial. The pervasive nature of ICs and the need for their low-cost production has led to the globalization of IC design and manufacturing process, which has raised various security concerns including; (i) malicious tampering of ICs during fabrication to include Hardware Trojans (HT); and (ii) IC counterfeiting. To detect HTs and IC counterfeiting, we require an examination method to ensure the manufactured IC is consistent with the intended design. Here, we present a robust, rapid, and nondestructive IC authentication technique, which relies on imaging the optical watermarks embedded in predetermined locations in the IC. The watermark is a combination of unique signatures in the optical farfield reflection pattern created by modifying the physical layout of logic gates. These high-contrast optical signatures are enabled by embedding an innovative combination of plasmonic nanoantennas and grating structures directly in the metal-1 layer of the gate design. The uniqueness of logic gates’ optical signatures is ensured through different plasmonic nanoantenna dimensions and periodicity of the surrounding gratings. For the rapid readout of the watermarks, we present a confocal dark-field imaging technique utilizing modulated structuredillumination and lock-in signal acquisition. By combining these innovations in plasmonic nanoantennas and optical imaging, we demonstrate through numerical simulations a 30-fold contrast in polarization dependent reflectivity for each embedded optical signature allowing rapid read-out of watermarks and direct authentication of the IC design.