22 September 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Traffic management systems capture tremendous video data and leverage advances in video processing to detect and monitor traffic incidents. The collected data are traditionally forwarded to the traffic management center (TMC) for in-depth analysis and may thus exacerbate the network paths to the TMC. To alleviate such bottlenecks, we propose to utilize edge computing by equipping edge nodes that are close to cameras with computing resources (e.g., cloudlets). A cloudlet, with limited computing resources as compared to TMC, provides limited video processing capabilities. In this paper, we focus on two common traffic monitoring tasks, congestion detection, and speed detection, and propose a two-tier edge computing based model that takes into account of both the limited computing capability in cloudlets and the unstable network condition to the TMC. Our solution utilizes two algorithms for each task, one implemented at the edge and the other one at the TMC, which are designed with the consideration of different computing resources. While the TMC provides strong computation power, the video quality it receives depends on the underlying network conditions. On the other hand, the edge processes very high-quality video but with limited computing resources. Our model captures this trade-off. We evaluate the performance of the proposed two-tier model as well as the traffic monitoring algorithms via test-bed experiments under different weather as well as network conditions and show that our proposed hybrid edge-cloud solution outperforms both the cloud-only and edge-only solutions.
5 December 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems
Trojan backdoor is a poisoning attack against neural network (NN) classifiers in which adversaries try to exploit the (highly desirable) model reuse property to implant Trojans into model parameters for backdoor breaches through a poisoned training process. To misclassify an input to a target class, the attacker activates the backdoor by augmenting the input with a predefined trigger that is only known to her/him. Most of the proposed defenses against Trojan attacks assume a white-box setup, in which the defender either has access to the inner state of NN or is able to run backpropagation through it. In this work, we propose a more practical black-box defense, dubbed TrojDef . In a black-box setup, the defender can only run forward-pass of the NN. TrojDef is motivated by the Trojan poisoned training, in which the model is trained on both benign and Trojan inputs. TrojDef tries to identify and filter out Trojan inputs (i.e., inputs augmented with the Trojan trigger) by monitoring the changes in the prediction confidence when the input is repeatedly perturbed by random noise. We derive a function based on the prediction outputs which is called the prediction confidence bound to decide whether the input example is Trojan or not. The intuition is that Trojan inputs are more stable as the misclassification only depends on the trigger, while benign inputs will suffer when augmented with noise due to the perturbation of the classification features. Through mathematical analysis, we show that if the attacker is perfect in injecting the backdoor, the Trojan infected model will be trained to learn the appropriate prediction confidence bound, which is used to distinguish Trojan and benign inputs under arbitrary perturbations. However, because the attacker might not be perfect in injecting the backdoor, we introduce a nonlinear transform to the prediction confidence bound to improve the detection accuracy in practical settings. Extensive empirical evaluations show that TrojDef significantly outperforms the-state-of-the-art defenses and is highly stable under different settings, even when the classifier architecture, the training process, or the hyperparameters change.
7 October 2020 in IEEE Access
From recent research work, it has been shown that neural network (NN) classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples which contain special perturbations that are ignored by human eyes while can mislead NN classifiers. In this paper, we propose a practical black-box adversarial example generator, dubbed ManiGen. ManiGen does not require any knowledge of the inner state of the target classifier. It generates adversarial examples by searching along the manifold, which is a concise representation of input data. Through extensive set of experiments on different datasets, we show that (1) adversarial examples generated by ManiGen can mislead standalone classifiers by being as successful as the state-of-the-art white-box generator, Carlini, and (2) adversarial examples generated by ManiGen can more effectively attack classifiers with state-of-theart defenses.