Nils Köbis

Nils Köbis

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Nils Köbis

Research Center Trustworthy Data Science and Security, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 June 2021 in Nature Human Behaviour
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Journal Article
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NKNils Köbis
Nils Köbis
JBJean-François Bonnefon
Jean-François Bonnefon
IRIyad Rahwan
Iyad Rahwan

29 October 2021 in iScience
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Journal Article
Open access
NKNils C. Köbis
Nils C. Köbis
BDBarbora Doležalová
Barbora Doležalová
ISIvan Soraperra
Ivan Soraperra
Hyper-realistic manipulations of audio-visual content, i.e., deepfakes, present new challenges for establishing the veracity of online content. Research on the human impact of deepfakes remains sparse. In a pre-registered behavioral experiment (N = 210), we show that (1) people cannot reliably detect deepfakes and (2) neither raising awareness nor introducing financial incentives improves their detection accuracy. Zeroing in on the underlying cognitive processes, we find that (3) people are biased toward mistaking deepfakes as authentic videos (rather than vice versa) and (4) they overestimate their own detection abilities. Together, these results suggest that people adopt a “seeing-is-believing” heuristic for deepfake detection while being overconfident in their (low) detection abilities. The combination renders people particularly susceptible to be influenced by deepfake content.

29 June 2015 in PLOS ONE
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NKNils C Köbis
Nils C Köbis
JPJan-Willem van Prooijen
Jan-Willem van Prooijen
FRFrancesca Righetti
Francesca Righetti
PLPaul A M Van Lange
Paul A M Van Lange
Corruption poses one of the major societal challenges of our time. Considerable advances have been made in understanding corruption on a macro level, yet the psychological antecedents of corrupt behavior remain largely unknown. In order to explain why some people engage in corruption while others do not, we explored the impact of descriptive social norms on corrupt behavior by using a novel behavioral measure of corruption. We conducted three studies to test whether perceived descriptive norms of corruption (i.e. the belief about the prevalence of corruption in a specific context) influence corrupt behavior. The results indicated that descriptive norms highly correlate with corrupt behavior—both when measured before (Study 1) or after (Study 2) the behavioral measure of corruption. Finally, we adopted an experimental design to investigate the causal effect of descriptive norms on corruption (Study 3). Corrupt behavior in the corruption game significantly drops when participants receive short anti-corruption descriptive norm primes prior to the game. These findings indicate that perceived descriptive norms can impact corrupt behavior and, possibly, could offer an explanation for inter-personal and inter-cultural variation in corrupt behavior in the real world. We discuss implications of these findings and draw avenues for future research.

10 July 2019 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
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NKNils C. Köbis
Nils C. Köbis
BVBruno Verschuere
Bruno Verschuere
YBYoella Bereby-Meyer
Yoella Bereby-Meyer
DRDavid Rand
David Rand
SSShaul Shalvi
Shaul Shalvi
Is self-serving lying intuitive? Or does honesty come naturally? Many experiments have manipulated reliance on intuition in behavioral-dishonesty tasks, with mixed results. We present two meta-analyses (with evidential value) testing whether an intuitive mind-set affects the proportion of liars ( k = 73; n = 12,711) and the magnitude of lying ( k = 50; n = 6,473). The results indicate that when dishonesty harms abstract others, promoting intuition causes more people to lie, log odds ratio = 0.38, p = .0004, and people to lie more, Hedges’s g = 0.26, p < .0001. However, when dishonesty inflicts harm on concrete others, promoting intuition has no significant effect on dishonesty ( p > .63). We propose one potential explanation: The intuitive appeal of prosociality may cancel out the intuitive selfish appeal of dishonesty, suggesting that the social consequences of lying could be a promising key to the riddle of intuition’s role in honesty. We discuss limitations such as the relatively unbalanced distribution of studies using concrete versus abstract victims and the overall large interstudy heterogeneity.

1 December 2021 in Psychological Bulletin
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MLMargarita Leib
Margarita Leib
NKNils Köbis
Nils Köbis
ISIvan Soraperra
Ivan Soraperra
OWOri Weisel
Ori Weisel
SSShaul Shalvi
Shaul Shalvi
Although dishonesty is often a social phenomenon, it is primarily studied in individual settings. However, people frequently collaborate and engage in mutual dishonest acts. We report the first meta-analysis on collaborative dishonesty, analyzing 87,771 decisions (21 behavioral tasks; k = 123; nparticipants = 10,923). We provide an overview of all tasks used to measure collaborative dishonesty, and inform theory by conducting moderation analyses. Results reveal that collaborative dishonesty is higher (a) when financial incentives are high, (b) in lab than field studies, (c) when third parties experience no negative consequences, (d) in the absence of experimental deception, and (e) when groups consist of more males and (f) younger individuals. Further, in repeated interactions, group members' behavior is correlated-participants lie more when their partners lie-and lying increases as the task progresses. These findings are in line with the justified ethicality theoretical perspective, suggesting prosocial concerns increase collaborative dishonesty, whereas honest-image concerns attenuate it. We discuss how findings inform theory, setting an agenda for future research on the collaborative roots of dishonesty. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

20 December 2019 in Behavioural Public Policy
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NKNils C. Köbis
Nils C. Köbis
MTMarleen Troost
Marleen Troost
CBCyril O. Brandt
Cyril O. Brandt
ISIvan Soraperra
Ivan Soraperra
Corruption in the form of bribery continues to be a major societal challenge around the world. The current lab-in-the-field study tested whether dynamic descriptive norms messages on posters can help to reduce bribery. Before, during and after placing posters throughout a medium-sized South African town, incentivized measures of social norms and bribery were assessed in a mobile lab. A total of 311 participants stemming from the general population took part. In line with the pre-registered predictions, the results reveal that people: (1) perceive bribery to be less common; and (b) engage in bribery in a corruption game less frequently when the posters were displayed. The discussion outlines how social norms nudging campaigns can be leveraged to spur collective action against corruption.