Marie E. Killerby

Marie E. Killerby

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Marie E. Killerby

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention COVID-19 Emergency Response, Division of Emergency Operations Atlanta, GA 30329, and Fort Collins, CO 80521

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2018 in Journal of Clinical Virology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MKMarie E. Killerby
Marie E. Killerby
HBHolly M. Biggs
Holly M. Biggs
AHAmber Haynes
Amber Haynes
RDRebecca M. Dahl
Rebecca M. Dahl
DMDesiree Mustaquim
Desiree Mustaquim
JWJohn T. Watson
John T. Watson

1 February 2020 in Emerging Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MKMarie E. Killerby
Marie E. Killerby
HBHolly M. Biggs
Holly M. Biggs
CMClaire M. Midgley
Claire M. Midgley
SGSusan I. Gerber
Susan I. Gerber
JWJohn T. Watson
John T. Watson
MERS-CoV Transmission: Current Evidence

22 June 2022 in Vaccines
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ACAnn Carpenter
Ann Carpenter
MWMichelle A. Waltenburg
Michelle A. Waltenburg
AHAron Hall
Aron Hall
JKJames Kile
James Kile
MKMarie Killerby
Marie Killerby
TGthe Vaccine Preventable Zoonotic Disease Working Group
the Vaccine Preventable Zoonotic Disease Working Group
Zoonotic diseases represent a heavy global burden, causing important economic losses, impacting animal health and production, and costing millions of human lives. The vaccination of animals and humans to prevent inter-species zoonotic disease transmission is an important intervention. However, efforts to develop and implement vaccine interventions to reduce zoonotic disease impacts are often limited to the veterinary and agricultural sectors and do not reflect the shared burden of disease. Multisectoral collaboration, including co-development opportunities for human and animal vaccines, expanding vaccine use to include animal reservoirs such as wildlife, and strategically using vaccines to interrupt complex transmission cycles is needed. Addressing zoonoses requires a multi-faceted One Health approach, wherein vaccinating people and animals plays a critical role.

11 January 2019 in Open Forum Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MKMarie E Killerby
Marie E Killerby
FRFaye Rozwadowski
Faye Rozwadowski
XLXiaoyan Lu
Xiaoyan Lu
MCMardea Caulcrick-Grimes
Mardea Caulcrick-Grimes
LMLisa McHugh
Lisa McHugh
JWJohn T Watson
John T Watson
Background: Human adenoviruses (HAdVs) are known causes of respiratory illness outbreaks in congregate settings, but cases and clusters are less well described from community settings in the United States. During December 2016–February 2017, the New Jersey Department of Health received reports of HAdV infections from 3 sources in 3 adjacent counties. We investigated to characterize the epidemiologic, laboratory, and clinical features of this HAdV outbreak. Methods: A case was defined as a New Jersey resident with acute respiratory illness during December 1, 2016–March 31, 2017 with laboratory identification of HAdV genome type 7d (HAdV-7d). Human adenovirus was detected by real-time and conventional polymerase chain reaction and molecular typed by partial hexon capsid protein gene sequencing. The HAdV genome type was identified by whole genome sequencing analysis. Available medical, public health, and surveillance records were reviewed. Results: We identified 12 cases, including 3 treatment facility patients, 7 college students, and 2 cases at a tertiary-care hospital. Four cases died; all had underlying comorbidities. Nine HAdV-7d whole genome sequences obtained from all 3 sites were nearly identical. Conclusions: Transmission of HAdV-7d occurred in community and congregate settings across 3 counties and resulted in severe morbidity and mortality in some cases with underlying comorbidities. Clinicians and local and state health departments should consider HAdV in patients with severe respiratory infection.

1 May 2019 in Emerging Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AKAhmed Khudhair
Ahmed Khudhair
MKMarie E. Killerby
Marie E. Killerby
MMMariam Al Mulla
Mariam Al Mulla
KEKheir Abou Elkheir
Kheir Abou Elkheir
WTWassim Ternanni
Wassim Ternanni
AHAron J. Hall
Aron J. Hall
Camel contact is a recognized risk factor for Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection. Because specific camel exposures associated with MERS-CoV seropositivity are not fully understood, we investigated worker–camel interactions and MERS-CoV seroprevalence. We assessed worker seroprevalence in 2 slaughterhouses and 1 live-animal market in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, during 2014–2017 and administered an epidemiologic survey in 2016 and 2017. During 2014–2017, we sampled 100–235 workers, and 6%–19% were seropositive for MERS-CoV at each sampling round. One (1.4%) of 70 seronegative workers tested at multiple rounds seroconverted. On multivariable analyses, working as a camel salesman, handling live camels or their waste, and having diabetes were associated with seropositivity among all workers, whereas handling live camels combined with either administering medications or cleaning equipment was associated with seropositivity among market workers. Characterization of high-risk exposures is critical for implementation of preventive measures.

31 December 2018 in Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KAKhalid H. Alanazi
Khalid H. Alanazi
MKMarie E. Killerby
Marie E. Killerby
HBHolly M. Biggs
Holly M. Biggs
GAGlen R. Abedi
Glen R. Abedi
HJHani Jokhdar
Hani Jokhdar
JWJohn T. Watson
John T. Watson
Objective: To investigate a Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) outbreak event involving multiple healthcare facilities in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; to characterize transmission; and to explore infection control implications.Design: Outbreak investigation.Setting: Cases presented in 4 healthcare facilities in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: a tertiary-care hospital, a specialty pulmonary hospital, an outpatient clinic, and an outpatient dialysis unit.Methods: Contact tracing and testing were performed following reports of cases at 2 hospitals. Laboratory results were confirmed by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) and/or genome sequencing. We assessed exposures and determined seropositivity among available healthcare personnel (HCP) cases and HCP contacts of cases.Results: In total, 48 cases were identified, involving patients, HCP, and family members across 2 hospitals, an outpatient clinic, and a dialysis clinic. At each hospital, transmission was linked to a unique index case. Moreover, 4 cases were associated with superspreading events (any interaction where a case patient transmitted to ≥5 subsequent case patients). All 4 of these patients were severely ill, were initially not recognized as MERS-CoV cases, and subsequently died. Genomic sequences clustered separately, suggesting 2 distinct outbreaks. Overall, 4 (24%) of 17 HCP cases and 3 (3%) of 114 HCP contacts of cases were seropositive.Conclusions: We describe 2 distinct healthcare-associated outbreaks, each initiated by a unique index case and characterized by multiple superspreading events. Delays in recognition and in subsequent implementation of control measures contributed to secondary transmission. Prompt contact tracing, repeated testing, HCP furloughing, and implementation of recommended transmission-based precautions for suspected cases ultimately halted transmission.