Characterizing the fault space of a cipher to filter out a set of faults potentially exploitable for fault attacks (FA), is a problem with immense practical value. A quantitative knowledge of the exploitable fault space is desirable in several applications, like security evaluation, cipher construction and implementation, design, and testing of countermeasures etc. In this work, we investigate this problem in the context of block ciphers. The formidable size of the fault space of a block cipher mandates the use of an automation strategy to solve this problem, which should be able to characterize each individual fault instance quickly. On the other hand, the automation strategy is expected to be applicable to most of the block cipher constructions. Existing techniques for automated fault attacks do not satisfy both of these goals simultaneously and hence are not directly applicable in the context of exploitable fault characterization. In this paper, we present a supervised machine learning (ML) assisted automated framework, which successfully addresses both of the criteria mentioned. The key idea is to extrapolate the knowledge of some existing FAs on a cipher to rapidly figure out new attack instances. Experimental validation of this idea on two state-of-the-art block ciphers – PRESENT and LED, establishes that our approach is able to provide fairly good accuracy in identifying exploitable fault instances at a reasonable cost. Utilizing this observation, we propose a statistical framework for exploitable fault space characterization, which can provide an estimate of the success rate of an attacker corresponding to a given fault model and fault location. The framework also returns test vectors leading towards successful attacks. As a potential application, the effect of different S-Boxes on the fault space of a cipher is evaluated utilizing the framework.
23 October 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
In side-channel analysis (SCA), Points-of-Interest (PoIs), i.e., the informative sample points remain sparsely scattered across the whole side-channel trace. Several works in the SCA literature have demonstrated that the attack efficacy could be significantly improved by combining information from the sparsely occurring PoIs. In Deep Learning (DL), a common approach for combining the information from the sparsely occurring PoIs is softmax attention. This work studies the training instability of the softmax attention-based CNN models on long traces. We show that the softmax attention-based CNN model incurs an unstable training problem when applied to longer traces (e.g., traces having a length greater than $10K$ sample points). We also explore the use of batch normalization and multi-head softmax attention to make the CNN models stable. Our results show that the use of a large number of batch normalization layers and/or multi-head softmax attention (replacing the vanilla softmax attention) can make the models significantly more stable, resulting in better attack efficacy. Moreover, we found our models to achieve similar or better results (up to 85% reduction in the minimum number of the required traces to reach the guessing entropy 1) than the state-of-the-art results on several synchronized and desynchronized datasets. Finally, by plotting the loss surface of the DL models, we demonstrate that using multi-head softmax attention instead of vanilla softmax attention in the CNN models can make the loss surface significantly smoother.
Power side-channels give rise to several potent attack vectors for leaking information in digital circuits. While a plethora of (mathematically robust) solutions exist to tackle such side-channels, their deployment through existing VLSI design-flows remains an important engineering issue. Besides, most existing solutions result in significant hardware overhead hindering their practical usage for resource-constrained settings, such as Internet-of-Things (IoT) or embedded devices. In this paper, we address both of these issues through an integrated electronic design automation (EDA) tool-flow operating on gate-level designs. Based on an interesting observation that not every net in a design is equally susceptible to side-channel leakage, we devise a generic testing mechanism and lightweight albeit customizable protection strategy for a given trace count. We first analytically establish the observation based on certain physical properties of VLSI circuits and also validate it on ISCAS benchmark circuits. Next, we present a tool called VALIANT , which can identify the leaking nets for a given number of traces from the gate-level netlist of a cipher. VALIANT works alongside state-of-the-art design automation tools and, therefore, can be directly incorporated in existing design flows. After identifying the leaky subset of nets in a design, we propose a lightweight variant of an existing masking scheme to eliminate the leakage concerning a given trace count. The main feature of our protection scheme is that it takes into account subset of nets are not “leaky” and optimizes the usage of randomness and extra gates according to this information to minimize the overhead. Experimental evaluation over state-of-the-art lightweight S-Boxes and the GIFT block cipher establishes the efficacy of the proposed idea for generating lightweight protected solutions in an automated manner.