18 August 2021 in American Political Science Review
The production of economic surplus, or “prosperity,” was fundamental to financing the rise of pristine civilizations. Yet, prosperity attracts predation, which discourages the investments required for civilization. To the extent that the economic footing of civilization creates existential security threats, civilization is paradoxical. We claim that, in addition to surplus production, civilizations require surplus protection, or “security.” Drawing from archaeology and history, we model the trade-offs facing a society on its path to civilization. We emphasize preinstitutional forces, especially the geographical environment, that shape growth and defense capabilities and derive the conditions under which these capabilities help escape the civilizational paradox. We provide qualitative illustration of the model by analyzing the rise of the first two civilizations, Sumer and Egypt.
24 March 2023 in Journal of Urban Economics
1 June 2019 in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
27 April 2026 in Management Science
Screening human capital based on signals such as job applications or entrepreneurial pitches is crucial for organizations. Signals are often informative insofar as they require differential knowledge and effort to produce. Generative AI (GAI) complicates screening by lowering the cost of producing impressive signals. We model the informational effects of GAI, showing that applicants’ access to GAI can increase—and also decrease—an evaluator’s screening mistakes. This result depends on how GAI affects experts’ signals compared with nonexperts’. Using experiments in hiring and start-up investing, we estimate that senders’ access to GAI (ChatGPT) lowers screening accuracy by 4%–9% for employers and start-up investors. Consistent with our model, senders’ access to GAI also improves screening accuracy in some settings, in our case, among senders from non–English-speaking countries. These results show that GAI can profoundly shape screening accuracy. This paper was accepted by Anindya Ghose, information systems. Funding: We are grateful for the Columbia Business School Digital Future Initiative Grant for helping fund this project. B. Cowgill thanks the Kauffman Foundation Emerging Scholars Program, the Columbia Center for Political Economy, the NET Institute, and the Stellar Development Foundation. P. Hernandez-Lagos thanks the Yeshiva University Sy Syms Dean’s Research Fund. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07027 .
26 March 2026 in Journal of Corporate Finance
10 June 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
We propose a Malthusian model of conflict in the Neolithic to study the dynamics of inequality from the onset of agriculture. Societies evolve in a region where the total supply of land is fixed and undergo three distinct stages of development: An initial foraging stage, an expansion stage when arable land is abundant, and an encroachment stage when land becomes scarce, and societies compete for its control. For each stage, we characterize the division of economic surplus between elites and workers. Our main result is that inequality is not destined to rise with the adoption of agriculture: depending on the output elasticity of labor-our summary measure of workers' effective influence over the surplus-societies may follow trajectories that rise, fall, or exhibit a hump. Using data from 1,173 archaeological sites across six independent centers of agricultural origin, we document distinct regional paths consistent with the model. Inequality increased monotonically in West Asia and Europe, but followed inverse U-shaped patterns in South and Mesoamerica, as well as in East Asia. We argue that these heterogeneous trajectories reflect variation in a small set of ecological and technological parameters that shape workers' marginal productivity and, therefore, their bargaining power.