1 April 2021 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
8 August 2025 in Journal of Comparative Economics
22 August 2023 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
17 June 2020 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Do countries with differing political institutions respond differently to a national crisis? The coronavirus pandemic, where almost all countries were hit by the same crisis in a short span of time, provides a rare opportunity to answer this question. For a sample of 125 countries, we use high frequency data on two measures of policy response- (i) containment policies, relating to closure of public spaces and restrictions on movement of people, and (ii) health policies, relating to public information campaigns, testing and contact tracing, to examine their policy response to the crisis. We show that: first, non-democracies have more stringent containment and health policies prior to their first COVID-19 case. However, after registering their first case, democracies either close this gap (in containment policies), or surpass non-democracies (in health policies) within a week. Second, policy responses do not differ by governance systems (presidential or parliamentary) in democracies. However, elected leaders who performed better in the last election or face their next election farther in the future are more aggressive in their policy response. Third, democracies with greater media freedom respond more slowly in containment policies, but are more aggressive in health policies. Lastly, more conducive political norms (such as trust in the elected government) systematically predict a more aggressive response in both containment and health policies. Our analysis therefore suggests that political institutions and the incentives of the political leaders embedded therein, significantly shape the policy response of governments to a national crisis.
1 March 2021 in Journal of Public Economics
1 January 2023 in SSRN Electronic Journal
This paper examines the consequence of decentralization in the management of canal irrigation for spatial allocation of water and agricultural performance. Under centralized management, farmers closer to the canal tend to over-extract water, resulting in spatial mis-allocation. We test whether decentralization can improve spatial allocation of water by exploiting the staggered constitution of locally elected canal management bodies (“Pani Panchayats”) in the state of Orissa, India, that decentralized its canal management. Using survey data and a heterogeneous treatment effect estimation strategy using farmer level fixed effects, we show that farming plots farther away from the canal received less water under centralized system, but longer exposure to decentralization significantly reduces spatial mis-allocation. Consequently, agricultural revenue and wealth (landholding) improve more for those farmers. We find suggestive evidence that distant farmers’ ability to complain to local representatives is an important mechanism explaining our results.