We consider a communication problem in which a sender, Alice, wishes to communicate with a receiver, Bob, over a channel controlled by an adversarial jammer, James, who is myopic. Specifically, for blocklength n, the codeword Xn transmitted by Alice is corrupted by James who must base his adversarial decisions (of which locations of Xn to corrupt and how to corrupt them) on the non-causal observation Zn of Xn obtained through a noisy memoryless channel. More specifically, our communication model may be described by two channels. A memoryless channel pZjX from Alice to James, and an Arbitrarily Varying Channel from Alice to Bob, pY jXS governed by a state Sn determined by James. In standard adversarial channels the states Sn may depend on the codeword Xn, but in our setting Sn depends non-causally only on James’s view Zn. We present upper and lower bounds on the capacity of myopic channels. For a number of special cases of interest we show that our bounds are tight. We then extend our results to the setting of secure communication, in which we require that the transmitted message remains secret from James. For example, we show that if (i) James may flip at most a p fraction of the bits communicated between Alice and Bob, and (ii) James views Xn through a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability q, then once James is “sufficiently myopic” (in this case, when p < 0:5 and H(q) > H(p)), then the optimal communication rate is that of an adversary who is “blind” (that is, an adversary that does not have any knowledge of Xn at all), which is 1.. H(p) for standard communication, and H(q)..H(p) for secure communication. A similar phenomenon exists for more general models of communication.