24 July 2023 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Humans reason and care about ethical issues, such as avoiding unnecessary harm. But what enables us to develop a moral capacity? This question dates back at least to ancient Greece and typically results in the traditional opposition between sentimentalism (the view that morality is mainly driven by socioaffective processes) and rationalism [the view that morality is mainly driven by (socio)cognitive processes or reason]. Here, we used multiple methods (eye-tracking and observations of expressive behaviors) to assess the role of both cognitive and socioaffective processes in infants’ developing morality. We capitalized on the distinction between moral (e.g., harmful) and conventional (e.g., harmless) transgressions to investigate whether 18-mo-old infants understand actions as distinctively moral as opposed to merely disobedient or unexpected. All infants watched the same social scene, but based on prior verbal interactions, an actor’s tearing apart of a picture (an act not intrinsically harmful) with a tool constituted either a conventional (wrong tool), a moral (producing harm), or no violation (correct tool). Infants’ anticipatory looks differentiated between conventional and no violation conditions, suggesting that they processed the verbal interactions and built corresponding expectations. Importantly, infants showed a larger increase in pupil size (physiological arousal), and more expressions indicating empathic concern, in response to a moral than to a conventional violation. Thus, infants differentiated between harmful and harmless transgressions based solely on prior verbal interactions. Together, these convergent findings suggest that human infants’ moral development is fostered by both sociocognitive (inferring harm) and socioaffective processes (empathic concern for others’ welfare).
1 October 2022 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
Forster and Dannenberg's (2010) GLOMO(sys) theory claims that people process perceived events and internal information in a more global or more local processing mode and that adopted modes should transfer to other, unrelated tasks. If so, global/local processing modes would qualify as metacontrol states that are assumed to regulate processing dilemmas, like persistence/flexibility, exploitation/exploration, or speed/accuracy (Goschke, 2000). Given increasing rates of nonreplications of previously demonstrated far transfer from prime tasks that are likely to induce a particular global or local processing bias to logically and temporally unrelated probe tasks, we tested whether near and far transfer can be demonstrated under conditions that should be optimal for such transfer. We reduced the temporal distance between prime and probe trials by integrating them into a dual-task paradigm and used probe tasks that were either almost identical to the prime task or at least shared the relevant modality and attentional demands. We obtained significant transfer effects between almost identical visual global/local tasks, irrespective of the degree of cognitive conflict that these tasks generated, but did not find any evidence for somewhat farer transfer to other visual tasks, like a flanker task and an attentional blink task. That is, any substantial change in the probe task's characteristics compared with the prime task eliminated almost any signs of transfer. Altogether, we conclude that either global/local processing modes as envisioned by GLOMO(sys) do not exist or they normally do not transfer from global/local tasks to other, unrelated tasks.
1 September 2022 in Experimental Psychology
Mood has been argued to impact the breadth of human attention, but the empirical evidence supporting this claim remains shaky. Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008) have attributed previous empirical inconsistencies regarding the effect of mood on attentional breath to a critical role of approach/avoidance motivation. They demonstrated that the combination of positive affect with high, but not with low, motivational intensity improves performance during processing local information and impairs performance during processing global information. The latter, but not the former, was replicated by Domachowska et al. (2016). Since we were interested in the modulation of attention by valence and motivation, and considering the inconsistencies in the findings, we replicated the critical experiments of both studies in four online experiments but found no significant effect of either valence or motivational intensity on attention. Taken together, our evidence casts doubt on a systematic relationship between mood or motivation on the one hand and global/local processing on the other.
19 December 2025 in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Self-prioritization effects found in label–shape matching tasks have been demonstrated extensively. Participants are faster to match label–shape label–shape stimuli against a prelearned mapping, the more self-related the label is. The effect is thought to be driven by special cognitive treatment, saliency, or attentional prioritization of self-referential stimuli. However, the exact underlying mechanism remains elusive. We propose an alternative explanation, namely that self-related labels facilitate matching performance by inducing the so-called self-positivity bias (people tend to represent themselves more positively than they represent others), which is conducive to matching. To test this idea, we skipped the learning of label–shape mappings in our task. Furthermore, we used a shape–shape matching task. Thus, participants did not have to determine whether label–shape combinations match a previously learned mapping, but merely whether two geometrical figures are the same (match) or not (mismatch). Crucially, each trial was preceded by a more or less self-related prime word. This setup enabled us to measure self-prioritization effects in the absence of task directed links between target and self-related stimuli. In Experiment 1, self-related labels (“YOU”, “FRIEND”, “STRANGER”) resulted in faster matching responses. Experiment 2 replicated the effect and ruled out word length as an alternative explanation (prime words: “YOURSELF”, “FRIEND”, and “OTHER”). Our findings suggest that the self-positivity bias at least contributes to self-prioritization effects. Furthermore, our theory explains interaction effects between match versus mismatch trials and self-relatedness of the labels, as found in many experiments.
6 November 2026 in Psychological Research
1 March 2025 in Experimental Psychology
The idea that self-control (or executive) functions depend on limited “mental resources” that can be depleted (aka ego-depletion) has generated a lot of interest, but both the empirical status of the phenomenon and its theoretical explanation remain controversial. Here, we tested a widely neglected but straightforward prediction of ego-depletion theory: The longer people work on a control-demanding task, the more should their ego deplete. If so, ego-depletion effects should become more pronounced as time on (control) task increases. To test that prediction, we carried out an online experiment, in which participants switched between blocks of a numerical Stroop task (NST) with either 50% or 10% incongruent trials, which served to induce different degrees of ego depletion, and a Global-Local Task (GLT), which served to measure the impact of ego depletion. We predicted that participants would perform more poorly on the GLT if it is combined with the more demanding NST and that this performance cost would systematically increase over time on task. Although the classical Stroop and global-local effects were replicated, we found no evidence that our experimental manipulation successfully induced an outcome that can be considered as evidence for ego depletion. We conclude that our findings contribute to the growing literature questioning the robustness of ego-depletion effects under certain task conditions.