1 November 2020 in Global Policy
We call for strengthening the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) to manage the economic effects of COVID‐19, in particular the massive capital outflows from emerging market and developing economies EMDEs and the global shortage of dollar liquidity. Both the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate that EMDEs need an immediate $2.5 trillion, yet the financing available to them is just $700 to $971 billion. To meet these immediate needs we propose to: (1) broaden the coverage of the Federal Reserve currency swaps; (2) issue at least $500 billion of special drawing rights through the IMF; (3) improve the IMF’s precautionary and emergency facilities; (4) establish a multilateral swap facility at the IMF; (5) increase the resources and geographic coverage of regional financial arrangements; (6) coordinate capital flow management measures; (7) initiate debt restructuring and relief initiatives; and (8) request that credit‐rating agencies stop making downgrades during the emergency. It argues that leaders should swiftly move to address these structural gaps in the GFSN: (1) agree on a quota reform at the IMF; (2) create an appropriate sovereign debt restructuring regime; (3) expand surveillance activity; and (4) adopt IMF governance reform and strengthen its relations with all agents of the GFSN. All of these reforms must be calibrated toward a just transition to a more stable, inclusive, and sustainable global economy.
13 January 2019 in Development and Change
11 December 2020 in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, East Asia’s efforts to enhance regional financial cooperation raised the possibility of East Asia playing a more assertive role in global financial governance. However, despite the region’s increased voice in governance and economic weight, East Asian financial systems and markets have mostly adapted to global norms developed in New York, London, and Washington, DC. We argue that the failure of East Asia to push an alternative vision of financial governance reflects both the lack of regional political unity and, more crucially, the divisions of interests both between and within key East Asian economies. Despite nearly universal regional dissatisfaction with global standards and institutions in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, these two factors have combined to prevent the development of a distinctive regional model that could be promoted at the global level.